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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1   The problem
The purpose of this project was to analyze the political economy of forest 
preservation in a developing country with increasing foreign trade in agricultural 
commodities.  The uniqueness of the work resided in the application of a 
multidisciplinary and quantitative approach to the solution of a natural resource 
exploitation problem for a specific nation facing the challenge of balancing the need to 
protect natural habitat with the opportunity of increasing the production of beef, which 
could require further clearing the tropical forest. 
The tropical areas of the “New World” are home today to some of the last primary 
forests on Earth, and those forests have been disappearing over the years.  Today’s 
industrialized countries deforested vast tracts of land during the 19th century, when they 
were developing.  The US, for example, cut its forested land in half to make room for 
agriculture, and at the end of the 1880s it had a rate of deforestation that exceeds by an 
order of magnitude the current rate in South America (Hartwick and Olewiler 1998).  But 
the problem today is primarily circumscribed to the less developed nations.
2The Neotropic has an immense value: it provides services such as carbon 
sequestration, soil conservation, oxygen generation, bio-prospecting, water storage, 
tourism, and others (Ramirez 2000).  Castro and Barrantes (1999) provide a list of 36 
benefits that natural ecosystems can provide.  However, that knowledge has not been 
enough to stop deforestation.  Why?  Unsustainable natural resource exploitation is one 
of the reasons: new markets for timber and agricultural products have opened up, 
influencing land-use decisions that have favored the conversion of forests into pastures 
and cropland.
1.2   The relationship between trade and environment
Discussions on the relationship between environment and trade started in the 
1970s (Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001), when several industrialized countries already 
had environmental agencies, public awareness of ecological issues had reached 
unprecedented levels, and discussions were becoming global, as demonstrated for 
example by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at 
Stockholm.  Then in 1992 “Agenda 21” proposed the promotion of sustainable 
development through commerce.  The classical theory of comparative advantage 
demonstrates that unrestricted trade between nations results in higher welfare and 
consumption for all participating countries, although it admits that not every sector within 
each society will benefit.  Trade makes sense if a country exports goods requiring a lot of 
resources widely available domestically and imports goods requiring scarce resources.  
3The result is specialization in the production of a few commodities with associated 
economies of scale and efficiency.  What is the benefit for the environment?  
A developing country that opens-up to foreign trade could enjoy increased 
revenue and foreign investment that could potentially be accompanied by a transfer of 
cleaner technologies, resulting in less marginal pollution (Husted and Logsdon 2001).  If 
the country succeeds in raising the income level of its population this may in turn drive 
up their demand for a cleaner environment, as quality of life issues become significant for 
people.  Higher income levels have also been associated with better education and lower 
fertility rates (Anderson and Strutt 1996).  However, a true income level increase will 
depend on the “leakage rate” defined by the proportion of income spent in purchasing 
goods and services coming from abroad for a specific economy (Hackett 2001).  Also, the 
income level after which a demand for environmental goods starts increasing may be too 
high (Perrings and Ansuategi 2000).
The potential benefits of increased international trade rest on a number of 
assumptions, therefore depending on which of those hold untrue, there could be negative 
consequences.  For example, if technology is held constant in a country in which exports 
are increasing, then production will increase and associated pollution will also increase 
(Damian and Graz 2001-a).  Moreover, comparative advantage is a dynamic 
phenomenon, and that is why expecting monetary benefits from trade that can then be 
used to modernize pollution control technology can be risky.  The market prices for some 
commodities are very volatile, and as a consequence what could be perceived as a great 
business opportunity one year, could result in a financial fiasco the next year.  The 
4benefits of specialization are greatly diminished if a large number of producers enter 
what once was a profitable market (Costanza et al. 1995).
When exports are primarily derived from natural resources exploited in small 
developing countries where property rights are not well defined, over-exploitation, 
poverty and environmental degradation are likely to form a vicious cycle, and open trade 
can actually be welfare reducing (Chichilnisky 2001, Brander and Taylor 2003).  An 
increase in foreign trade fueled by the consumption of basic commodities in the North 
could result in natural resources being irreversibly depleted in the South before any 
significant economic benefit can be obtained.
On the other hand, if prices of commodities exported by developing countries are 
relatively low while their imports have high price tags, then impoverishment will be a 
likely consequence (Cabeza-Gutés and Martinez-Alier 2001).  More poverty can result in 
more exploitation to generate some income, and the cycle continues while degradation is 
accelerated.  Advantageous terms of exchange are then required if a country is to benefit 
from trade, and that is something difficult to achieve when the exporter is a “price-taker” 
(when the price is set by groups of buyers).
Another argument against free trade predicts that in order to attract foreign 
investment, countries will lower their environmental standards in a “race to the bottom” 
that will result in the lowest possible standard being adopted (Damian and Graz 2001-a).  
That premise lacks empirical evidence, probably because in the great scheme of things 
the cost of environmental compliance is quite low in typical industries, and companies 
look for a comprehensive “package” of benefits and incentives when deciding where to 
5build their factories.  Environmental regulation is just one among many aspects to be 
considered (like labor costs, infrastructure, taxes, and political stability).  
Labeling free trade as either beneficial or detrimental is too simplistic.  The 
question is how to make it consistent with the protection of natural resources, the control 
of pollution, and the achievement of social equity.  Proposals on how to make that 
happen abound.  For example Damian and Graz (2001-b) suggest a balanced approach 
that goes beyond international policies and economic stimuli, one in which trade is 
“managed” having sustainable development as the end goal.  Anderson and Grewell 
(2001) define “free market environmentalism” in which global goals are translated into 
local policies and decision-making aligned with the promotion of economic growth.  
Costanza et al. (1995) advocate for the inclusion of environmental safeguards in 
international trade agreements and for establishing mechanisms to force producers to 
internalize environmental costs.
However, past attempts at including far-reaching environmental clauses in 
commerce treaties have failed.  During the making of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the harmonization of standards, the participation of NGOs in 
dispute resolutions, and the protection of domestic environmental regulations against 
treaty-related challenges were all left out.  The only concession that came along with free 
trade was a program to improve conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border (Brunelle and 
Deblock 2001).  The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADB) were created with 
NAFTA in 1993.  Both institutions have had a ridiculously small budget and the 
overwhelming task of solving trade related issues and endemic misery problems along the 
6border (Runge 2001).  Those problems persist today and the degree of investment 
provided by the NADB has been rather timid, totaling a few hundred million dollars that 
have been used to finance primarily potable water projects (Frisvold and Caswell 2000).
The supposedly observed and often predicted effects of free trade are issues that 
have existed for years in many places (wealth vs. poverty, environmental degradation vs. 
protection, etc).  The extent to which those phenomena are influenced by international 
commerce is questionable and hard to measure, although it can be shown that the 
promises of free trade have not always held true.  The relationship between trade and 
environmental decay is not direct.  Domestic production and consumption are the ones 
directly related to pollution and changes in land use patterns (Anderson and Strutt 1996).  
Domestic environmental policy, therefore, could be the solution for sustainable trade, and 
that is the possibility that was researched in this study.
1.3   Why Costa Rica?
This project used the country of Costa Rica as the geographic, political, social and 
economic unit of analysis to study policy options for preservation.  That country has been 
a relevant beef exporter in Latin America since the 1970s (Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2002), and although that sector of the economy is no longer as strong as it 
was during the 1980s, government officials have hopes that a future opening of new 
markets will give it a new momentum (Monge 2003).  Many other reasons justify the 
selection of that nation for the study.
7First of all, because of its fragmented landscape, access to two oceans, and 
because its territory serves as a bridge between two sub-continents, Costa Rica has 12 
life-zones with an estimated 4% to 6% of the world’s species in only 0.04% of the 
planet’s terrestrial area, making it potentially the nation with the highest biodiversity per 
unit area of the world (Vaughan et al. 1998), and giving conservation efforts there high 
relevance and a global importance.  Already identified species in the country include for 
example 850 birds, 9000 plants, 280 mammals and hundreds of thousands of insects, 
making it more bio-diverse than all of Europe and than the US and Canada combined 
(Evans 1999).  Costa Rica is a valid case for the study of natural habitat preservation 
because there is a lot to be protected.
Gigantic conservation steps have already been taken in that country: 11% of its 
territory is protected under national park status, 4% under indigenous reserve and 13% 
under national forest, wildlife refuge or biological reserve status.  The second 
justification in selecting Costa Rica is that its contemporary history shows that habitat 
protection is achievable.  The question in this case is not how to justify the start of 
conservation efforts, but instead how to balance competing land use interests that involve 
the potential loss of the remaining unprotected natural habitat. 
A third reason why studying Costa Rica makes sense is that its political, social 
and economic climate is such that the environment can realistically be put into the 
national agenda.  The country has been politically stable since 1949, it has the oldest and 
most consolidated democracy in Latin America (Steinberg 2001), its society has a middle 
income level, and its education and health indicators are at par with developed societies 
(The World Bank Group 2003).  Since the Human Development Index was instituted by 
8the United Nations, Costa Rica has consistently ranked among the top nations of Latin 
America, and according to the World Economic Forum (2002) the country ranks seventh 
among a group of 142 nations on the Environmental Sustainability Index (and second 
overall among developing nations).  Those factors make it a promising case for 
environmental policy implementation.
The loss of natural habitat can be a highly complex phenomenon, driven by 
several factors like timber exploitation, subsistence agriculture, urbanization, an 
expansion of agricultural land, poaching, general population pressures and others.  Trying 
to explain it by considering all possible factors can result in a shallow analysis, but 
concentrating on only one can be misleading if that factor is not the most significant.  All 
authors on the topic agree that deforestation in Costa Rica has been driven primarily by 
the expansion of pastures to raise cattle for selling beef in international markets (Brockett 
and Gottfried 2002, Brown 1990, Castro and Barrantes 1999, Evans 1999, Goodstein 
2002, Lutz and Daly 1991).  That increases the validity of a project that precisely 
compared the societal benefits and costs of ranching and forest preservation.  The fourth 
reason behind the selection of Costa Rica is that it allows for the isolation of one cause as 
the possible major explanatory variable for deforestation, allowing for a more detailed 
study.  Other factors may also play a role, but a minor one.  For example population 
growth in the country is currently close to replacement levels (except for immigration) 
and therefore it is not expected to be a major threat to preservation (The World Bank 
Group 2003).
The fifth reason why Costa Rica represents a case from which a lot can be learned 
is that natural habitat there continues to be threatened.  The country already has in place 
9free trade agreements with six other nations, and negotiations are underway with several 
more.  The Central American Free Trade Agreement, already ratified by most of its 
members, would double the export quota of Costa Rican beef into the US overnight, and 
that may stop the current pasture reforestation trend in the country (Ministerio de 
Comercio Exterior 2004).  Far from being over, the search for a strategy to provide 
meaningful, long term conservation continues.  A number of protected areas in a sea of 
deforestation provide only a mediocre solution to the problem of biodiversity protection.  
The purchase of all the remaining forest by the government would not be realistic or 
desirable from the perspective of a developing country with serious public budget 
restrictions and with a desire to limit the role of the state in private affairs.  The challenge 
then consists of how to implement public policy in a non-interventionist manner, 
preferring to influence land use decisions by the private sector so as to favor reforestation 
instead of establishing strict limits or regulations.
Finally, Costa Rica was chosen for this study because the data needed to conduct 
it was available.  The country has been widely studied from ecological and political 
perspectives.  In the middle of the 1980s, for example, more articles published in the 
prestigious journal Ecology were studies performed in Costa Rica than in any other 
country (Vaughan et al. 1998).  The digital maps and socio-economic data required to 
build the biophysical, economic and political models was obtainable.  A few research 
projects have dealt with the issue of deforestation in Costa Rica.  Those include 
comparing timber exploitation to cattle raising and corn and bean growing (Howard and 
Valerio 1996), modeling the watershed effects of deforestation in a cloud forest, 
predicting the effect of taxing pesticides on the production of crops and the potential land 
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conversion issues (Schipper et al. 1999), comparing the economic benefits and costs of 
producing different crops in specific regions of the country, and analyzing some of the 
benefits or costs of forest conservation (Ramirez 2000, Castro and Barrantes 1999).  
Some of those studies were conducted before the current conservation legislation was 
enacted, and some include only the ecological perspective of the problem, while others 
cover only the economic perspective, and none of them deal with more than one or two 
categories of monetary benefits or costs of conservation.
Naturally there are limitations in selecting any unit of analysis.  Costa Rica is a 
very small country with a surface area slightly above 51,100 km2 (about 10% smaller 
than West Virginia), so even if it has an enormous biodiversity value, gains in carbon 
sequestration achieved through conservation there would be very modest when compared 
for example to the Amazon basin.  Also, the environmental achievements of its neighbors 
have not been that significant, and that constitutes a threat against the long term 
protection of natural habitat, which does not recognize political borders.  If the rest of 
Central America does not do its part, the protection of biodiversity throughout the 
isthmus will be unfeasible.
1.4   Description of the dissertation
This study is organized into four major chapters beyond the introduction.  Chapter 
2 provides an overview of the conservation history of Costa Rica, and as such it places 
the research in a historical context that is useful to understand the current situation and 
the prospects for future environmental legislation.  Chapter 3 presents a bio-physical 
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model that was built to estimate the pollution at the outlet of a major watershed in the 
Costa Rican North Pacific under different forest/pasture ratios.  The model explains the 
potential gains in terms of environmental degradation that could be achieved through 
different policies, and it investigates whether the current land-use distribution is optimal 
or not.  Chapter 4 describes an economic model aimed at finding the optimal land-use 
distribution, from the perspective of social welfare maximization, under different 
scenarios.  Each scenario corresponds to a specific set of values for the variables believed 
to play a major role in determining what the optimum forest cover should be.  The model 
shows the possible effect of different economic policies on the decision-making process 
of the private sector with respect to reforesting or deforesting.  Chapter 5 includes an 
analysis of the perspectives different sectors of the Costa Rican society have around the 
problem of deforestation and its potential solutions, to provide the context for a 
comparison of two possible environmental policies: augmenting subsidies for 
conservation, and increasing the tax on pastureland.  The policies are discussed from the 
perspective of legitimacy criteria, and observations about an implementation strategy are 
included.
Chapters three through five correspond to three distinct articles that were written 
during the course of this project.  The biophysical model was presented at the 9th
International Conference on Environmental Science and Technology in Rhodes, Greece, 
which took place from September 1 through September 3 of 2005.  The paper was 
published in the proceedings, and it also was selected by the scientific committee for 
publication in the Journal of the Global Network for Environmental Science and 
Technology.  The economic model was submitted the first week of August 2005 for 
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publication in the journal World Development, and the political analysis was submitted
the third week of August 2005 for publication in the journal Natural Resources Forum of 
the United Nations.  Each of those chapters starts with a brief introduction about how that 
part of the research was conducted, then the paper is included, and then a short 
conclusion lists some reflections about the work and opportunities for future research.  
Finally, Chapter 6 offers the general conclusions about the entire study.
13
CHAPTER II
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN COSTA RICA
The government approach to environmental matters in Costa Rica has undergone 
an evolution similar to the one experienced by other countries (Lowry 2003), in that three 
distinct eras can be identified: “no regulation” or “laissez-faire”, “command with no 
control” or “interventionist”, and “balanced” or “hybrid”.
2.1   The no-regulation era
When in 1502 Christopher Columbus set foot on the land now called Costa Rica, 
only a few thousand natives lived there, spread out into tribes occupying vast natural 
spaces.  Through the colonial regime Spain regarded that colony as an area of minor 
importance because its lack of precious metals and labor.  The first permanent colonial 
settlement did not happen until 1562 and one century later the population of Spaniards in 
the area was just a few hundred (Wilson 1998).  That situation gave Costa Rica a chance 
to acquire a greater level of autonomy than the other Latin American counterparts 
(Esposito 2002).
14
The emergence of a powerful and wealthy Spanish elite happened quite late in 
Costa Rica, and to a lesser degree when compared to its neighbors.  Natives were few and 
hostile to the settlers.  The Europeans were forced to cultivate their own land and had to 
be content with keeping small farms with just a few enslaved “Indians”.  The Spanish 
rule allowed for the acquisition of land by settlers after they had been peacefully 
occupying a given territory for ten years.  That way of assigning property rights 
continued through most of the 20th century.  Even though the population was very low 
during colonial times, in 1775 the governor of the province issued a proclamation 
discouraging controlled burns on the basis that too much land was being cleared and 
causing soil sterility (Evans 1999).
The Costa Rican elite could not base its economic power on just exploiting land 
and native labor: they had to develop the commerce and finance sector to generate more 
income.  The farmers and merchants then overlapped and became a relatively 
homogenous class, while in the rest of Central America they continued to be distinct 
groups, often having divergent political and economic interests.  After becoming 
independent in 1821, Costa Rica started growing its economy primarily through the 
exportation of coffee.  By 1890 that commodity accounted for more than 90% of export 
earnings.  The country moved from being the poorest province in Central America during 
colonial times to being the richest nation of the region at the turn of the 20th century.  
State intervention was prominent and included the free distribution of coffee saplings, 
availability of credits for the creation of processing facilities and infrastructure 
developments, like the construction of a railroad so that the product could be transported 
from the Central Valley to the Caribbean coast (Wilson 1998). 
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The government gave 800,000 acres of land on a 99 year lease to the foreign 
company that built the railroad as part of the payment, and they decided to plant bananas 
on it, for export to the US and Europe.  The banana business then grew as a foreign 
entity, isolated from the rest of Costa Rica, self-sufficient and relying on its nexus to the 
US for financing, transportation, marketing, and supplies.  A parallel labor market 
emerged when blacks were brought from Jamaica to satisfy the manpower shortages in 
the plantations.  Coffee, as a contrast, grew as a business in which several Costa Ricans 
participated.  By World War I, bananas and coffee represented 85% of the exports 
(Wilson 1998).  The agricultural sector began to slowly put some pressure on the land 
through deforestation and pollution generation.   Still today some coffee mills discharge 
their waste with no treatment into rivers.  
But the income from foreign trade allowed the development of education.  In 
1844 the University of Santo Tomás was created, and it was staffed with European 
professors, some of which were naturalists who wrote books about the country, further 
motivating other scientists to visit the area.  Discussions about constructing an inter-
oceanic canal across Central America also drew scientists to the country (Evans 1999).
Politically, Costa Rica tried to stay away from the conflict between liberals and 
conservatives that was prominent in the Central America of the 19th century.  Up to 1889, 
heads of state seized power by striking deals with the elite, by fraud or by political 
violence.  Then on that year an election was won by an opposition candidate who was 
allowed to take office and finish up the term peacefully.  That was the first time that such 
an event happened anywhere in Latin America (Wilson 1998).  
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A few regulations related to the environment were created during the first few 
decades of independence: decrees mentioning forest preservation, including the 
prohibition to cut trees near some key waterways, were proclaimed in 1833 and 1846; in 
1853 hunting laws were passed, in 1881 a ban on dynamite fishing was approved and in 
1888 a decree related to the protection of watersheds was signed (Steinberg 2001).  Then 
at the beginning of the 20th century the National Geographic Institute and the National 
Museum were created and some of their employees were sent to study at the Smithsonian 
Institute.  That move created key contacts with naturalists from the US who started to 
visit Costa Rica in larger numbers and continue to do so to this day.  
Environmental regulations timidly continued to emerge when Law Number 36 
was passed in 1906, asking the executive power to recommend a forestry policy that 
never became a reality.  Then the first National Park was created in 1913.  In that same 
year another law declared zones 600 ft from coasts and 800 ft from rivers “national 
forests”, but no enforcement mechanism was devised for protection.  Other attempts at 
environmental policy followed, but they were more written intentions than real 
regulations (Evans 1999).
Education continued to evolve and in 1926 an agricultural school was formed, and 
through 1940 it was a hub for the discussion of soil conservation and related matters.  
Finally in 1941 the University of Costa Rica (UCR) was born and after that citizens did 
not have to go to Europe or the US to pursue higher education.  The school of agriculture 
designed in 1953 a draft for a Soil and Water Conservation Law, requiring studies to be 
conducted throughout the country to recommend land uses.  That work was used as the 
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starting point for the creation of the first forestry law almost two decades later (Steinberg 
2001).
The biology program at the UCR began in 1955.  The number of local scientists 
increased significantly afterwards, and their political influence became relevant in the 
national conservation agenda.  In 1956 a wildlife conservation law declared that all non-
domesticated species were the property of the state, part of its renewable resources and 
something to be conserved, and regulations for hunting and fishing were enacted (Evans 
1999).  The establishment of higher education and research was also fueled by 
international institutions: in 1942 the Organization of American States established in 
Costa Rica the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Sciences (IICA) to promote 
research and education in agriculture and natural resources.
Costa Rica first participated in an international meeting related to nature 
preservation in 1940: the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation of 
the Western Hemisphere in Washington D.C.  Then in 1948 in Denver, Colorado, the 
country was part of the Inter-American Conference for the conservation of Renewable 
Natural Resources, a forum designed to share ideas and promote cooperation.  In 1950 
the government instituted the National Week for the Conservation of Natural Resources, 
to be celebrated each year in June to nurture a consciousness among citizens about the 
importance of preserving nature.  In 1953 a Costa Rican wrote the “Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Nature and the Responsibilities of Man”, and presented it at the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) world conference of that year 
(Steinberg 2001).
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A foreign initiative was behind the creation of the first private reserve and first 
environmental non-governmental organization (NGO).  In the early 1950s, a group of 
Quakers from Alabama left the US protesting the Korean war, looking for a peaceful 
place to live.  They established what is today the largest and best known privately owned 
protected area in the country.  Then in 1959 the international group “Brotherhood of the 
Green Turtle” created the Caribbean Conservation Corporation in Costa Rica.  That NGO 
would later succeed in lobbying for the creation of a national park on the Caribbean coast 
(Evans 1999).
The second third of the 20th century was also characterized by the formation of 
important social groups such as unions, the middle class, church-sponsored labor groups, 
think tanks, and the precursors of today’s political parties.  That was the era of significant 
public health and labor reforms; the nationalization of the banking system, which allowed 
the government to take a central role in managing the economy; the abolishment of the 
army; the creation of state owned “autonomous institutions” that monopolized diverse 
services (electricity, water, telecommunications, insurance, oil refining, etc.) and 
provided them under highly subsidized rates; the recognition of women’s and minorities’ 
rights and the beginning of the import substitution strategy (Wilson 1998).  All those 
changes were instrumental in the country improving its social and economic indicators 
faster than its neighbors.  Increasing international coffee prices helped keep inflation and 
public debt under control.
Diversification was pursued not only in industry, but also in agriculture.  As a 
result of that drive, the raising of cattle grew exponentially since the beginning of the 
1950s, and other products were introduced, like cocoa and tobacco.  But import 
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substitution was not easy for a small nation such as Costa Rica.  The creation of the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) established high tariffs for products outside 
of the region, so each Central American country would have relatively easy access to the 
market of its neighbors.  Costa Rica was not convinced of the benefits of the CACM, but 
offers of economic help from president John F. Kennedy influenced the government to 
join in 1963 (Wilson 1998).  
Incentives were implemented to attract foreign and local investment.  Growth in 
industry created an industrial elite, and growth in government a bureaucratic class.  
However, the incentives for investors were renewed repeatedly, discouraging
industrialists from improving their production efficiency.  Exchange rates promoted the 
importation of raw materials, creating a disproportionate trade imbalance, and natural 
resources were exploited with no considerations of sustainability.  The environment was 
not yet part of a national agenda.
Since the beginning of time, throughout the 1800s and up to the middle of the 
1960s conservation seemed unnecessary in Costa Rica, and it actually did not happen to 
any significant degree.  That was the “no-regulation era”.
2.2   The command era
The “command” era starts when the government tries to impose restrictions on 
environmental degradation.  That degradation became significant when agricultural 
production continued to increase and diversified to include sugarcane, fruits, flowers, etc. 
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2.2.1  Reasons behind the birth of environmental regulation in Costa Rica
Multinationals dedicated to the fruit exporting business became influential 
landowners and they showed no environmental stewardship in how they managed their 
plantations.  United Fruit Co. abandoned most of its (now infertile) plantations in the 
Caribbean in the 1940s, and moved to the South Pacific.  Accelerated degradation and 
deforestation continued until the beginning of the 1990s, when local and international 
environmental groups threatened banana companies with boycotts and forced them to 
improve their standards (Evans 1999).  Recycling plants were built for plastic bags 
covering the fruit during its growth, reforestation programs were implemented and codes 
of environmental conduct were adopted.
On the other hand, the 2000 ranching families who control the cattle industry 
became the major actors behind deforestation (Brown 1990).  The production of beef was 
initially for the domestic and Central American markets, but at the beginning of the 
1970s there was an exponential growth in the US demand, to satisfy the fast food 
industry.  In 1970 the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) gave Costa Rica a quota 
representing a full 10% of its beef imports.  The quota was lowered in the 1980s (Evans 
1999).
By 1980, one third of the country had been converted to grassland, while only 9% 
of its territory can support that use in a sustained way.  The number of cattle went from 
600,000 in 1950 to more than 2,000,000 in 1985 (Esposito 2002).  Between 1950 and 
1973, 71% of all newly cleared land was turned into pastures and dedicated to cattle 
grazing.  The total grassland area grew from 0.8 million hectares in 1950 to 2.2 million 
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hectares in 1984 (Lutz and Daly 1991).  By the mid 1990s pastures covered about 47% of 
the country, while some 40% of it was still forested (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).
Another factor influencing environmental degradation during the 20th century was 
the growing population, the unstable job market in several plantations and Costa Rica’s 
lax property rights, which resulted in the proliferation of squatters who adopted 
subsistence agriculture as their way of life.  In 1941 a law would allow possession of up 
to 300 hectares of land as long as the occupant cleared at least half of it and maintained 
cattle at the minimum rate of one animal for every 5 hectares.  Those “improvements” 
would give the landholder a chance to obtain title, but many of them never cared to get 
their land registered, and up to 1990 still 60% of farms did not have formal titles 
(Brockett and Gottfried 2002).
In 1961 the Institute of Lands and Colonization (ITCO) was created to help 
settlers.  Sanctions were imposed on owners not cultivating their land through a tax that 
was not abolished until 1977, while squatters were given access to some areas where they 
practiced subsistence agriculture.  Some individuals obtained title to land they had been 
occupying, others were relocated, etc.  Unfortunately, they used unsustainable practices, 
acquired debts, sold their properties to ranchers and then moved to new areas, often 
illegally.  In the 1980s environmental education and fund raising were successful in 
helping settlers relocate away from protected areas.  The law that created ITCO also 
emphasized that land with no title, not occupied and not in private hands was the property 
of the state.  It also gave the government the right to declare which lands were not 
suitable for agriculture and the power to expropriate terrains that were not fulfilling any 
social function.  Volcanoes, islands, rivers and lakes were officially declared the property 
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of the state, and a provision that banned tree cutting, construction and agriculture on 
those lands was enacted (Evans 1999).
It was the threat from squatters and to a certain extent ranchers that prompted the 
creation of the first state owned natural reserve in 1965.  A Scandinavian couple that was 
living on the North Pacific coast felt that squatters and ranchers were encroaching into 
areas of high natural value.  They wrote petitions to international conservation 
organizations, and over five of them donated the required money for the purchase of a 
tract of land that was given to ITCO for administration.  At that time locals did not 
understand why the reserve was being set aside, and the country had no experience in 
managing protected areas (Evans 1999).
The second major development that initiates the command era is the expansion of 
epistemic communities through the consolidation of influential education and research 
institutions, in part thanks to the influx of a number of scientists from the US who were 
interested in the study of tropical ecology and felt attracted to Costa Rica because of its 
political stability and proximity to the US (Steinberg 2001).  Some relevant examples of 
key organizations include the Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza
(CATIE), or “Tropical Agricultural Center for Research and Education”; the 
Organization of Tropical Studies (OTS); the “National Council for Technological and 
Scientific Research” or Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas
(CONICIT) and the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBIO), or “National
Biodiversity Institute”.  
CATIE was created from IICA in 1972 as an international higher education and 
research institution for the tropics.  Its extensive campus is sited right in the middle of the 
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Caribbean lowlands, and the center is staffed by professors from various countries, but 
primarily from the US and Costa Rica.  The student body is also highly diverse.
OTS is a non-profit research organization sponsored by 47 higher education 
institutions from the US and 5 from Costa Rica and the national museums of both 
countries.  Its administrative headquarters are located at Duke University in North 
Carolina.  Three reserves in Costa Rica are owned by OTS.
CONICIT is a state institution equivalent to the National Science Foundation of 
the US.  Since their creation in 1973 they have supported a number of initiatives related 
to conservation and the environment.  INBIO is also a state sponsored organization that 
was created much later, in 1989, with the goal of protecting the biodiversity of the 
country through the identification and classification of new species, which takes up most 
of their time, the implementation of projects to derive profit from biodiversity, and the 
environmental education of the Costa Rican citizens.  INBIO was the first of its kind in 
the tropics and today it benefits from strong partnerships with the private sector.
These and other organizations provided avenues for the population to get involved 
in studying environmental matters, they gained an international reputation, attracted 
foreign support, and created durable links between the Costa Rican environmental 
movement and institutions in other countries.
2.2.2  The Forestry Law and the growth of the environmental movement
An increase in the awareness of the growing threat of deforestation among the 
intellectual and bureaucratic elite prompted the government to create in 1967 an 
interdisciplinary committee to study the issue and recommend the creation of a regulation 
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to solve the problem.  The committee included some representatives from government 
agencies, the private sector and academia.  Some of its members had been discussing the 
need for such a statute for decades, and finally the matter had been put on the political 
agenda.  The committee looked at ecological and economic issues, reviewed laws and 
experiences of other countries, and after two years of work they presented a draft to the 
legislative body (Steinberg 2001).  During the time the regulation was discussed letters 
from the general citizenry, groups of students, professional associations, and even 
schoolchildren poured into Congress in support of it.  The media did not provide much 
coverage, deciding to focus on other issues instead.  The statute was finally approved, in 
part because it had a “multiple use” language in it and it stressed economic benefits and 
the possibility of sustainable forest exploitation (Evans 1999).
The Forestry Law of 1969 was a breakthrough: it was the first statute with 
comprehensive conservation clauses in the history of the country.  It was later amended 
in 1973, 1979, 1986 and 1996.  Some of its main provisions included the creation of the 
National Parks Department, a forestry office within the Ministry of Agriculture, a system 
for recommending land uses, and an incentive program for reforestation and forest 
preservation.  The incentives scheme resulted in more than 50,000 reforested hectares by 
the mid 1990s, when the first stage of the program ended.
The National Parks System grew exponentially throughout the 1970s, with the 
help of local institutions and domestic leaders: there were two parks in 1969, and there 
are over 29 today (Zebich-Knos 2002).  Issues such as lack of experience and funding 
were solved by sending people abroad for training, by lobbying in Congress to secure 
budgets, and later during tough times by obtaining the financial support from 
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international conservation organizations.  Public relations campaigns both domestically 
and abroad were intense and they focused on showing the richness of what was being 
protected.  The participation of social civic groups like the local Boy Scouts and the 
Peace Corps was also helpful in getting things done, and schools from all over the 
country were often special guests at the parks.  According to Evans (1999), the support 
from the First Lady between 1972 and 1974 and the leadership of the National Parks 
System (NPS) administrator during its first decade of existence were two major 
determining factors in the success of conservation during that time.  Silva (2003) asserts 
that the existence of a national epistemic community was a constant influence that 
convinced politicians decade after decade about the importance of preservation. 
The beginning of the 1970s saw the birth of significant environmental conflicts:  
members of UCR opposed the establishment of a bauxite extraction mine from the 
Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) on Costa Rican soil in 1970; a local biologist 
organized public protests and got support from some politicians to defeat the proposal of 
an inter-continental oil pipeline that was to cross the country from ocean to ocean; and a 
few years later a group fighting against the construction of a new highway going to the 
Caribbean Coast finally agreed to the project under the promise that a new national park 
would be created on the forest to be crossed by the highway.
Environmental NGOs entered the social picture during the 1970s.  ASCONA was 
the first one to emerge in 1972 when a group of people inspired by the Stockholm 
conference of the UN decided to get organized and fight for environmental causes.  They 
worked in lobbying and litigation, and then lost strength at the beginning of the 1990s.  
Other groups include AECO (Asociación Ecologista Costarricense, or “Costa Rican 
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Ecological Association”), concerned about education and models of development, and the 
Fundación Neotrópica, a fund-raising group that works on research and the purchase of 
lands for conservation.  By the mid-1990s there were 88 environmental NGOs in Costa 
Rica (excluding those sponsored by universities), and 19 of them were part of the Costa 
Rican Federation for the Conservation of the Environment.  Today there are 245 local 
and national environmental groups, a few regional organizations (Central American or 
Latin American), and several international groups like Conservation International, the 
World Wildlife Fund, the Sierra Club, the Nature Conservancy, the Audubon Society and 
Friends of the Earth have projects, chapters and/or offices in Costa Rica (Steinberg 
2001).
In 1974 the country ratified the Convention on International Trade of Endangered 
Species (CITES), in part thanks to the pressure exerted by local groups who were assisted 
by foreign NGOs.  The second conference of the parties to CITES took place in San Jose 
in 1979.  In 1976 the Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna and Places of Natural 
Scenic Beauty in the Countries of the Americas was signed.  That convention outlined 
strategies to create national parks and preserves (Steinberg 2001).
The continuous creation of new protected areas happened because of a number of 
different reasons:  recommendations from scientists to the government, recommendations 
from the NPS to Congress, support from emerging NGOs, lobbying by recreational 
groups, the support of presidents (some parks were created through executive decree), the 
efforts of local communities that wanted to protect their region, and the help and 
influence of international organizations.  Between 1974 and 1978 the protected area of 
the country doubled, more than six national parks were created with little foreign support, 
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and the staff and budget of the NPS tripled.  The number of news items related to 
environmental matters published by the major national newspaper went from 5 per year 
in 1965 to 70 per year during the mid-1970s, and over 80% of them discussed national 
issues instead of international meetings or organizations.  During the same period, the 
number of “letters to the editor” with environmental content went from zero to twenty per 
year (Steinberg 2001).
The president, who had invested more than $2 million in conservation during his 
administration, declared 1977 the year of natural resources.  During that year the 
Reforestation Law was passed.  It abolished the tax on uncultivated land and it made 
loans and technology available for reforestation.  Then the National Parks Act was 
enacted, giving the NPS powers to charge fees, expropriate, etc.  The chamber of 
industries was against the statute for considering it too far reaching, but the support of 
political leaders and professional associations was enough to get it approved.  The 
president saw tourism as a potential benefit for the country that would become a reality 
thanks to conservation efforts.  He received the Albert Schweitzer award from the World 
Wildlife Fund in 1976 and the Green World Award of the New York Botanical Gardens 
in 1977.  In that same year, the Open University began offering a program in 
environmental education.  That program was complemented in 1982 with the creation of 
the Latin American Center for Environmental Education, that uses instructors from 
everywhere across the Americas to provide resources for teachers and courses in 
environmental issues.
The 1970s were a decade of economic bonanza for Costa Rica, with income per 
capita increasing 70% from 1968 to 1977 and the percentage of households living in 
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poverty decreasing from 50% in 1960 to 25% in 1980 (Schipper et al. 1998); but then in 
1979 the country experienced the worst economic crisis in its contemporary history: it 
acquired the highest per capita debt in Latin America, international prices of coffee and 
other exports decreased, oil prices increased, and trade with Central America was almost 
nonexistent due to civil wars in el Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala.  Unemployment 
and inflation reached historical highs.  The country was left with goods manufactured 
inefficiently that could not compete elsewhere.  In 1981 a representative from the World 
Bank told the president that he had to ask people to stop eating meat so everything could 
be exported, to aid in the monetary exchange crisis (Wilson 1998).  Before 1979 foreign 
aid for conservation was only about 2-3% of what the national government would put in, 
but that changed during the following decade (Steinberg 2001).
2.2.3 The economic crisis of the 1980s
The crisis made the role of international lending institutions more important in 
shaping policy-making in the country.  Some of the key players were the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Inter-American Development Bank.  USAID was particularly 
influential during the 1980s, lending or granting over $2 billion over several years, and 
positioning itself behind key initiatives like the creation of the Ministry of Commerce in 
1983 and the Coalición de Iniciativas de Desarrollo (CINDE), or “Development 
Initiatives Coalition” in the same year.  CINDE is a semi-private institution whose goal is 
to attract foreign investment into the country.  They have been a very influential interest 
group in economic policy making.
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The 1980s forced the country to look for new export opportunities in non-
traditional crops and markets outside Central America.  At the end of the 1980s non 
traditional agricultural exports were 30% of the total.  Free trade zones where companies 
enjoyed tax breaks for producing export commodities were established in several 
locations and grew in size rapidly.  The Caribbean Basin Initiative established by the US 
unilaterally lowered their import tariffs for several Central American and Caribbean 
products, and that further stimulated the growth of the economy.
A neo-liberal wave has been the defining force behind the evolution of the state 
since that time.  Welfare programs have been reduced and some privatization initiatives 
have been implemented, in opposition to the policies of the 1950s and 1960s that had 
taken the government expenditures to 54% of the GDP by 1980 (Schipper et al. 1999).   
The two dominant parties have been successful in carrying out that transformation by 
looking at ways to compensate the lower portion of society, operating gradually, 
influencing public opinion, and using the discontent of citizens regarding the 
performance of state institutions to justify privatization.  
As in many other developing countries, some of the neo-liberal measures 
implemented were prescriptions from international lending institutions.  Aid from the US 
had been historically low for Costa Rica, but at some point in the middle of the 1980s it 
reached an all time high of $200 million a year, and the country became the highest per 
capita recipient of aid from the US in the world.  Shortly after that the monetary flow 
sharply declined again, particularly after Costa Rica rejected a proposal from President 
Reagan to use its territory as a launching pad for an invasion to Nicaragua.  During 1994 
the US aid was a mere $6 million a year (Wilson 1998). 
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The crisis motivated the government to make some controversial decisions 
regarding environmental matters.  In 1981 the president announced he would segregate a 
portion of a newly created park because there was no money to pay the former 
landowners who had been expropriated.  In reality he was trying to expand rice 
production to alleviate the crisis.  Groups of students went to congress to protest, and 
letters were sent by local and international organizations.  Nothing made the government 
change its position, but a few months later the agricultural businesses themselves decided 
to donate most of the land back to the state (Evans 1999).
The economic crisis, however, was no excuse to stop conservation.  Both at the 
national and international levels efforts continued to expand protected areas.  In 1979 the 
United Nations approved Costa Rica’s request to create the “University for Peace” there, 
a research and education organization for non-military resolution of conflicts of all kinds, 
including environmental.  Today the university has an active program that includes 
several graduate and undergraduate degrees, and its current and former chief 
administrators have a number of environmental credentials.
In 1980 the country participated in the “World Strategy for Conservation” 
meeting, sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and IUCN.  That helped with the revision of a national 
conservation strategy. That same year the first National Congress on Wildlife 
Conservation was organized by the government to obtain advice on how to improve the 
wildlife conservation law.  The statute was amended in 1983 (and later in 1990 and 1992) 
by making hunting and fishing regulations stricter, by eliminating the “public utility” 
language and by creating a few national wildlife refuges.  The 1980s also saw an increase 
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in the use of environmental themes in the media through radio shows, soap operas, nature 
photography contests, and an important emergence of nature in the arts (Steinberg 2001).
During the 1978-1982 administration protected land again more than doubled, to 
attain over 8% of the territory.  The country turned to foreign sources for funds and 
received money from a number of governmental and non-governmental groups in Europe 
and the US.  Fundraising after 1979 achieved $5.5 million in 5 years.  The global benefits 
of the Costa Rican biodiversity, including for example the provision of habitat for 
migratory bird species coming from the US, were key selling points for foreign donors.  
The international aid trend continued throughout the 1980s, in part because sympathetic 
Western governments interested in winning the Cold War were quite agreeable to provide 
financing to Third World nations (Steinberg 2001).
A study conducted in 1985 by the “Costa Rican Tourism Board” or Instituto 
Costarricense de Turismo (ICT) determined that 75% of tourists visit the country because 
of its natural beauty.  The visits to National Parks increased by 50% between 1985 and 
1987.  In 1991 for the first time the number of foreign visitors to protected areas
surpassed the number of national visitors (Evans 1999). Today 11% of the country is 
under national parks and biological reserves, compared to a developing world average of 
5.8% and a developed world average of 7.2% (World Resources Institute 1999).  Another 
14% of the land in Costa Rica is regulated as forest preserve, indigenous reserve, wildlife 
refuge or national monument.  A significant proportion of the newest protected areas are 
in private hands (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).
Towards the end of the command era, a key institutional capacity improvement 
was made through the creation of the “Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and 
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Mines”, or Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas (MINEREM).  The 
president during 1986-1990 had been the planning minister four administrations before 
(1970-1974), and he had advocated then for the importance of creating an environmental 
agency, but the idea did not go far, until he was able to implement it himself while being 
in charge of the executive power of the nation.  In 1990 an environmental office was 
created within the Ministry of Foreign Relations to analyze and propose the ratification of 
international treaties and provide follow up to their implementation.  At the end of the 
1990s UCR began offering an environmental law specialization.  Between 1971 and 1975 
only 4% of the theses from the Law School of UCR were on environmental topics, and 
between 1991 and 1995 the rate climbed to 35% (Steinberg 2001).
2.2.4 The mixed results of the command era 
The first Forestry Law required that all tree cutting be approved by the Ministry 
of Agriculture on the basis of a management plan, that all land to be cleared for 
agriculture have a study showing that it was suitable for that use, and that all cutting be 
accompanied by a tax.  Unfortunately the statute lacked support from the rural 
community surrounding the numerous “to be protected” areas.  Peasants and farmers had 
not been involved in the creation of the law, and their economic activities were to be 
severely restricted or suspended.  
Poor enforcement, lack of funding and insufficient staffing at the Ministry of 
Agriculture actually allowed continuous degradation and accelerated rates of 
deforestation by squatters, cattle ranchers, loggers, miners and even proprietors who were 
not compensated following the creation of National Parks or feared their future 
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expansion.  In 2003 it was estimated that about $55 million were still needed to fully 
compensate former land owners who were expropriated when the various protected areas
were created, but only about $5 million are allocated each year from the national budget
for that purpose (Varela and Corella 2003).
Also during the 1970s and 1980s the government continued providing subsidies 
and credit for ranching and agriculture in general, and consumption in the developed 
world kept increasing, creating new markets for Costa Rican beef.  From 1956 to 1982 
the percentage of credit for ranching from total state credit rose from 13.8% to 23.3% 
(Lutz and Daly 1991).
On one hand, the National Parks System grew exponentially to the point that the 
country today has one of the highest percentages of protected land in the world, but on 
the other hand, land degradation outside the reserves increased, to the point that during 
the mid-1980s Costa Rica had the highest rates of deforestation in the world (3.9%) while 
grassland grew at 6.9% per year over the 1980s and into the mid 1990s (Goodstein 2002).  
The creation of reserves had not been enough to protect many species.  For example by 
1982 the habitat of the giant anteater had been reduced by 80% (Vaughan et al. 1998).
In 1987 the exportation of logs and unprocessed timber was banned, depressing 
domestic wood values to a fraction of international prices, weakening reforestation 
incentives, and subsidizing inefficient wood product industries (Southgate 1995, 
Hartwick and Olewiler 1998).  However, deforestation in Costa Rica has been driven 
primarily by a demand for agricultural land, not by a demand for forest products.  For 
example, up to 86% of the timber cut between 1953 and 1973 was burned or left to rot 
on-site (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).  Even farmland has been turned into pastureland, 
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with negative consequences for the rural labor market:  coffee requires 130 working days 
per hectare per year, rice requires 60, beans 37, and cattle only 6 (Evans 1999).  Many of 
those who lost their jobs went to the city to look for employment.
The Forestry Law had been successful in creating protected areas, but not in 
controlling deforestation on a national basis.  In 1983 a legislative commission on 
agricultural and natural resources proposed a total overhaul of the statute, in part because 
it had not controlled the logging and livestock industries.  Three years later an amended 
law was proposed, but it was challenged repeatedly, and it had to be re-designed and 
approved in 1990 as a temporary regulation while a more comprehensive one could be 
drafted.  That did not happen until 1996.
During the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 Costa Rica proposed that an 
Earth Council be based in its territory to follow-up on the agreements of the conference.  
The proposal was approved and the Council remained there until 2001.  Some sectors 
within the country spoke to the irony and the myth with no substance that was being 
created by selling Costa Rica as a center for ecology while trees were still being cut with 
little control.  At the end of the 1990s only about 5% of the forests were outside protected 
areas (Evans 1999).
The command era goes from the end of the 1960s to the middle of the 1990s.  Its 
most relevant features were the consolidation of agro-ecology research and education 
institutions, the birth of the Costa Rican environmental movement, the success in 
environmental diplomacy, and the enactment of the Forestry Law, that sparked the 
creation of the NPS but at the same time allowed land degradation to continue.
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2.3 The balanced era
The transition into the 21st century is bringing evidence of a more balanced 
approach to conservation in Costa Rica.  Hopefully this new era will be more 
participatory, equitable, innovative and easy to implement.
2.3.1 Regulatory framework
The amended Forestry Law of 1996 came up with simplified requirements for 
forest management, including renewable permits, and with participatory clauses to 
involve different stakeholders in the policy-making process.  The National Forestry 
Office was created as an advisory council to the Ministry of Agriculture, and it includes 
representatives from wood industries, environmentalists, forest owners and wood product 
retailers.
The law also created a new fund to compensate forest owners for the services 
provided by their land.  This latest regulation continued to prohibit cutting trees or 
converting forests to other uses in places were biodiversity and watershed protection are 
essential.
The environmental responsibilities of the government had been consolidated in 
1995 in the “Ministry of the Environment and Energy” or Ministerio de Ambiente y 
Energía (MINAE), created through the Organic Environmental Law, which is the first 
purely environmental regulation in the history of Costa Rica.  The statute was written to 
organize and unify under one roof the environmental responsibilities, regulations, policies 
and criteria of many government institutions, including diverse functions such as 
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conservation, pollution control and land use.  It helped clarify concepts and it provided 
more regulatory tools than were available before.  Specific discharge limits for 
wastewater were established, a process for reviewing environmental impact studies for 
new projects was defined, the use of leaded gasoline was banned, etc.  MINAE was to 
function as a de-centralized agency divided into eleven conservation areas with 
autonomous administration (Sagot 2000).
The performance of the different areas has been irregular, partly because de-
centralization has been too much of a burden for some local governments that lack the 
“know-how” to approve tree cutting permits and exert other functions.  Nevertheless,
some success stories demonstrate that the new system may very well be the solution the 
country was looking for.  Funding coming from diverse taxes is being sent to the different 
regions, where the participation of local NGOs has been intense, to the extent that some 
communities rely on them for enforcement (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).
2.3.2  Integrative conservation
An example of a participatory approach was the creation of the Guanacaste 
reserve: it went from a single National Park in the 1980s to a comprehensive conservation 
area a decade later.  Since colonial times, tropical dry forests were used more than the 
rainforest, due to the ease of transforming them into flat savannas after clearing, allowing 
quick conversion into agricultural fields.  Guanacaste is today the only large, protected 
dry tropical forest in the world (Evans 1999).   When “sustainable development” became 
a buzzword at the end of the 1980s, the government decided that they wanted the park to 
be part of a bigger picture of development and citizen consciousness.
37
Ecologists started by organizing field nature trips for schoolchildren, they formed 
fire control squads with locals and proposed grazing be allowed in a restricted area to 
control grass and build local support.  Building buffer zones was in vogue around the 
world and Costa Rica was not an exception.  That influenced the government to look for 
a budget to buy more land around the park.  Former ranchers and squatters were invited 
to join in the conservation area as researchers, caretakers and instructors, benefiting for a 
stable source of income not previously available.  Locals were better prepared than 
anybody else to control fires, poaching and other abuses.  The local tourism industry also 
continued to flourish and provide more jobs.  The reserve doubled its size in twenty years 
to attain 1,520 square kilometers in 2001 (Esposito 2002).
The goals of the government, the demands of the general population and the needs 
of the local citizenry were all combined into this integrative conservation case.  The 
government did not have to forego its control of the area, but could influence the 
behavior of the peasants without having to resort to expensive enforcement practices.  
The case of Guanacaste could become the blueprint for other conservation efforts across 
the country and even around the world (Lowry 2003), particularly considering that the 
creation of new protected areas in Costa Rica is not as important as achieving a real 
enforcement of the land currently under preservation status.  Properly protecting that one 
fourth of the territory may be sufficient to safeguard 95% of its biodiversity (Brockett and 
Gottfried 2002), as long as buffer zones are maintained around the parks and preserves, 
because some species are not suited for reproduction in fragmented habitats (James et al. 
2001).  About 80% of those potential buffer zones are today in private hands.
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2.3.3 Ecotourism
Ecotourism emerged during the 1990s as a great incentive to conservation.  By 
1994 that sector of the economy was the major earner of foreign exchange (Brockett and 
Gottfried 2002).  In 1995 Costa Rica hosted the second forum, seminar and workshop on 
eco-lodging, organized by the World Ecotourism Society, presided by a Costa Rican at 
that time.  The tourism sector at large generates 20% of the country’s foreign income, it 
represents 5% of its gross domestic product, and it employs about 12% of its labor force 
(Rivera 2002).
In 1997 tourism generated $700 million in revenues in the country, and national 
parks received $4 million in entrance and research fees (Evans 1999).  Today it is not 
uncommon for land owners to cater to “ecotourists” on their own forests.  The National 
Web of Private Reserves had, in 1998, more than 69 members, owning about 50,000 
hectares.  Forested land is now reported to have a higher market value than cleared land 
in some areas.  A sub-set of eco-tourism is what has been called “rural tourism”, in which 
residents of rural communities rent rooms to foreigners who are interested in visiting 
natural attractions.  That trend began around 1999 as a strategy for families to generate 
extra income while at the same time giving tourists a more genuine taste of local culture.  
On occasions, neighbor associations have joined forces to purchase small tracts of land 
for conservation and recreation, and they have also built small lodges.  That has 
represented a more stable source of income when compared to growing crops.  Rural 
tourism was born in Europe during the mid-1990s as an incentive to get people to 
repopulate small abandoned towns.  A guide to rural tourism in Costa Rica was recently 
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published with the help of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Andrade 
2004).
According to Zebich-Knos (2002), eco-tourism in Costa Rica is growing because 
there are ecological and economic needs, there is support from the government in the 
form of incentives, grass-root local movements are also encouraging and promoting 
tourism and there have been a number of private-public sector alliances.  Other countries 
with higher levels of total biodiversity have preferred to market to traditional tourism 
(like Mexico).
Tourism has potential dangers associated with negative environmental impacts, 
though.  One attempt to prevent its possible damaging effects was the creation in 1997 of 
a Certification of Sustainable Tourism (CST) by ICT, a performance-based, voluntary 
environmental program, pioneer in the developing world.  CST was designed by a 
partnership of academic institutions, the major hotel trade association, and some 
environmental NGOs.  By 1999 115 hotels had decided to enroll in the program and 52 
had been audited and given a rating.  By 2000 ICT began including CST in its 
international advertisements, and the World Tourism Organization decided to adopt the 
Costa Rican program as its voluntary environmental certification (Rivera 2002). 
2.3.4 Other benefits of biodiversity
Bio-prospecting also emerged during the 1990s as a positive environmental force.  
In Costa Rica parks have low human influence and they are well suited for research, 
contrary to the case of most of the US, Europe or Africa.  In 1992-1993, the 
pharmaceutical company Merck paid $1 million to INBIO for an agreement to conduct 
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research on potential drugs derived from the country’s biodiversity to cure a few specific 
diseases.  During those two years, the Merck payment was about 20% of INBIO’s 
budget.  Other bio-prospecting deals are underway, like the one involving INBIO, UCR, 
Cornell University and a Scottish University.  In that agreement 60% of the profits from 
any marketable chemical will go to INBIO.  The 1997 Biodiversity Law is aimed at 
conserving biodiversity, promoting its sustainable use as a resource, and distributing in a 
fair manner its associated costs and benefits.  The law declares that biodiversity is the 
property of the state (Sagot 2000).
The 1996 Forestry Law also resulted in the creation of new incentives for 
conservation.  The forest conservation certificate was designed for agreements spanning 
20 years.  The environmental service payment is given at a rate of $ 510 per hectare for 
reforestation, to be given during the first five years (50%, 20%, 15%, 10% and 5% per 
year) and with the commitment of the land owner to keep the area forested for another 15 
years.  For sustainable forest management $310/ha are given also during the first five 
years of a 20 year contract, and finally $230/ha are paid for forest preservation and 
natural regeneration during five years (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).  Many of the 
recipients of those payments are NGOs.  Financing comes primarily from a fossil fuel 
tax.  In 1997 alone $14 million were paid for environmental services coming from some 
100,000 hectares.  The law includes in its definition of environmental service carbon 
sequestration and storage, and the protection of watersheds, biodiversity, and ecosystems 
(Castro and Barrantes 1999).
Up to 70% of the benefits from forest preservation in Costa Rica accrue to the 
global community through carbon sequestration (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).  This is 
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where the “debt for nature swaps” and other similar initiatives come to play.  The swaps 
were an idea proposed by a group of international environmental NGOs that were 
successful at enlisting the participation of a few donor governments and several 
recipients.  During the early stages of that program fifteen countries participated and 
Costa Rica alone obtained one third of all the funds, in part because it had a lot of 
institutional capacity and a large network of NGOs willing to help and put pressure on 
the government.  By 1991, over $40 million had been erased from the country’s debt 
(Keohane 1996, Steinberg 2001).
The “Costa Rican Office for Joint Implementation” or Oficina Costarricense para 
Implementación Conjunta (OCIC), was created during the mid-1990s for the issuance of 
carbon bonds to be traded following the scheme proposed by the Kyoto protocol.  A few 
transactions have already taken place:  in 1997 Norway paid Costa Rica two million 
dollars for the sequestration of 200,000 tons of carbon.  The following year, the Dutch 
government received a carbon bond equivalent for $673,000 it paid for projects aimed at 
reducing methane emissions, and the next year they put up another $334,000 for carbon 
fixation.  Twenty-year carbon storage certificates issued by Costa Rica, valued at 
between $40 and $80 million, are currently being marketed at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (Ramirez 2000). 
2.4 Concluding comments
Costa Rica has been a very stable country since 1949, and it has been regarded as 
a pioneer in sustainable development for its efforts to conserve tropical forests, strike 
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agreements to place a value on future biodiversity discoveries, negotiate debt for nature 
swaps, and foster ecotourism (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).  Conservation has been 
relatively successful in the country thanks to the talent and drive of conservationists and 
the vision implanted in the Forestry Law.  The parks were created when there was still 
time left to provide meaningful protection and a large portion of the population showed 
an initial dose of enthusiasm.  
Today the pressure of population growth is not very strong, although that could 
change due to immigration.  The real pressure is coming from desired economic growth 
based on an expansion of agricultural land and continued uncontrolled industrial and 
municipal pollution.  The country still throws some of its sewage directly into rivers, it 
still lacks a comprehensive strategy for pollution regulation, and it continues struggling to 
protect some of its most diverse National Parks, where the populations of some species 
are close to replacement level due to the work of poachers who can, for example, sell a 
jaguar skin for more than $10,000.00 (Loaiza 2003). 
Will Costa Rica turn into a group of isolated conservation units in a sea of 
deforestation, unsustainable agriculture and pollution?  Outside of protected areas a 
number of forest fragments isolate wildlife and prevent vertical and horizontal migrations 
(Castro and Barrantes, 1999).  Land-use decisions regarding those private forests and 
their surrounding agricultural terrains will determine in the long run the real 
achievements of natural habitat protection in the country.  Costa Rica’s success stories 
are the result of efforts on the part of a few visionaries, concerned investors, exemplary 
public service officials and international organizations.  A national vision for forest
conservation exists, but its internalization by a critical mass in the population is
43
questionable.  The progress in conservation is obvious.  The question is whether it will be 
sustained and enhanced or not.
A number of things will need to happen if the country expects to live up to its 
reputation and truly become a model for sustainable development and biodiversity 
protection.  Perhaps the first and more important step is to get government agencies to 
become role models of environmental stewardship.  An obvious difference between 
recent environmental policy in Costa Rica as compared to the US is the fact that laws in 
the latter started by regulating the work of the government itself before they came up 
with standards for the private sector.  Another indispensable task is to come up with a 
strategy for dealing with foreign debt.  It is hard to alleviate poverty and assign a budget 
for forest preservation when 20% or more of the earnings from exports are sent back out 
as debt payments (Roddick 1999).  The management of finances within the government is 
also subject to improvement, as most of the revenues from taxes and other sources (like 
entry fees to national parks) go to a unique fund from where all the budgets are created.  
That does not guarantee a fair allocation of resources for environmental protection (Silva 
2003).
An interesting point is that economic development has not been a requirement for 
the Costa Rican citizenry to expect environmental protection.  Studies suggest that pro-
environmental attitudes in Latin American countries may be higher than in the U.S. 
(Rauwald and Moore 2002), demonstrating that high standards of living are not a 
prerequisite for being environmentally conscious.  An explanation could be that in places 
where environmental policy is in its infancy people are demanding significant 
improvements, while in places with relatively strong environmental protection regimes, 
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people may already have some level of comfort with the current state of things (Schultz 
et al. 2000).  Castro and Barrantes (1999) affirm that about 80% of Costa Ricans 
understand the value of conserving forests for water storage, and according to Steinberg 
(2001) a survey conducted during the mid-1990s concluded that 91% of citizens were 
willing to pay more for electricity and water if the additional money was to be used for 
biodiversity conservation.  People’s opinion about the seriousness of environmental 
problems has not correlated well to income per capita.  Costa Rica has today more citizen 
environmental groups per capita than California (Steinberg 2001).
The list of solutions provided by Goodstein (2002) for developing countries to 
make progress in sustainability includes ending detrimental subsidies while minimizing 
harm to losers; establishing property rights by providing a combination of communal, 
state and private ownership; enforcing regulations; and promoting the transfer of 
sustainable technologies from industrialized nations.  Those prescriptions are certainly 
applicable to Costa Rica.  The desire to reduce the role of the state, the need to create 
buffer zones around protected areas and the goal of stimulating agricultural 
intensification may be compatible if policies are constructed considering the benefits and 
costs of different land-use schemes and if policy instruments compatible with the 
statutory history of the country are implemented.
Costa Rica’s president announced in 2002 a plan to transform the country into an 
“ecological power” (Taylor 2002).  He created a new National Park, banned the 
transportation of logs during night hours, and placed a moratorium on open pit mining.  
Little improvements continue to happen, but until the nation comes up with enough will 
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to implement a comprehensive strategy for land-use management and invest in effective 
enforcement, deforestation and species extinction could continue.
A land-use policy should consider the environmental effects of different land 
distributions.  The following chapter describes the relationship between deforestation to 
make room for grasslands and river pollution.
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CHAPTER III
BIOPHYSICAL MODEL
3.1  Introductory comments
This first paper is based on the application of the Soil and Water Assessment Tool 
(SWAT) to the Nosara watershed in the North-West of Costa Rica, with the purpose of 
estimating the concentration of three pollutants at the outlet of the basin under different 
proportions of forest and pasture.  That area of the country was selected because data was 
available to conduct the study, the expansion of pastureland into forested land is viable, 
the largest ranches in the country are located there, and at the same time that area has 
some of the major reforestation projects underway.
SWAT is a software run through the Arcview interface that was developed in the 
mid-1990s by an interdisciplinary team working for the US Department of Agriculture 
and Texas A&M University.  It has undergone many improvements over the years.  In 
contrast with models based on purely empirical correlations, SWAT is based on
theoretical concepts and extensive databases with measured values, making it particularly 
reliable.  Furthermore, the data needed to run it is in general available, and its code is 
such that the number of calculations is minimized by lumping together different regions
with similar properties in the watershed, making it computationally efficient (Arnold et
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al. 1998). 
The minimum information needed to run SWAT includes maximum and 
minimum monthly temperatures for the watershed selected, a topographic map, latitude 
and longitude coordinates for the watershed, soil type and land cover.  The software uses 
the data to perform a series of detailed mass and energy balances in each sub-basin of the 
watershed, and it generates estimates of water flow out of the system, sediment run-off, 
pesticide residues, etc. 
The program has a number of components with sub-routines that allow it to 
estimate intermediate variables such as daily maximum and minimum temperatures, solar 
radiation, relative humidity and precipitation.  If available, data can be fed to the model 
and the “weather generator” can be turned off.  The software also models plant growth, 
routing of nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorous) and erosion.  The user can specify a 
number of management variables including irrigation, chemical application, grazing, 
harvest, and others.  For grazing, the user inputs the rate of biomass removed, the amount 
of manure deposited daily and the degree of trampling.  No adjustments are made for the 
possibility of having cattle directly at the edge of creeks and rivers (Neitsch et al. 2002).
The model has some limitations, like the inability to predict flooding events, to 
model the widening of channels, and to incorporate continuous changes in land-use 
patterns.  Also some routines do not account for specific boundary conditions, like the 
cessation of plant growth above certain temperatures.
The use of SWAT to predict with reasonable accuracy specific flows of water or 
sediment under certain conditions in a given period would require significant amounts of 
data and calibration effort; but the comparison of scenarios and the relative increase or 
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decrease in the values of dependent variables is much simpler and requires less 
information to provide meaningful results.
For this study maximum and minimum daily temperatures and precipitation were 
obtained for 1984 through 2003 (Instituto Meteorológico Nacional, 2004).  More than 
99.9% of the information was available, and missing data were taken as the average for 
the specific days for the period.  The land cover map is from 1997 and it has a resolution 
of 30 m x 30 m (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía 1998).  The soils had to be re-
classified using the United States Geological Survey (USGS) system with the help of a 
soil scientist.  The list of soils in the original and new classes is included in Appendix 1.  
The elevation map was taken from the USGS (2004), with a resolution of 90 m x 90 m.  
Four pixels were missing and they were filled by taking an average of the elevation in the 
neighboring pixels.
3.2  The impact of tropical deforestation on river chemical pollution
3.2.1 Extended abstract
Understanding how deforestation affects river water quality is essential in any 
comprehensive effort to manage watersheds and regulate land use.  The main objective of 
this study was to provide a quantitative description of the impact of converting tropical 
forests into pastures for cattle grazing in terms of the sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus 
concentrations at the outlet of a river basin located in North West Costa Rica.  This 
project also aimed at testing the possible environmental consequences of land-use 
management policies for that watershed.
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Twenty years of daily precipitation, maximum and minimum temperatures, and 
digital elevation, land cover and soil maps were used with the Soil and Water Assessment 
Tool (SWAT) to model the watershed.  SWAT had not been utilized to specifically 
model the potential effects of deforestation and related policies on river water quality in a 
tropical country in the way it was used in this project.  A flow balance calibration was 
performed by comparing results to published measurements, and a regression coefficient 
of 0.9886 was obtained for the best-fit line of the predicted vs. measured flows.
Graphs for sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus concentration vs. percent area of 
the watershed under pasture were plotted and the results showed an expected monotonic 
increase in pollutants as deforestation increased.  Contaminant levels at the main river 
outlet for the entire watershed as grassland were between 3 and 8 times higher than for 
the total area as forest, which could put at risk the drinking water supply and the tourism-
based economy of the region.  Keeping the current percent area under grassland constant,
but restricting pastures to the less fragile and more fertile lands could decrease the 
sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations at the main watershed outlet by more 
than 35%, 12% and 21%, respectively, as compared to the predicted pollutant 
concentrations for the current land cover distribution.
The effect of varying stocking rates was also tested and this resulted in lower 
sediment and nitrogen run-off for areas with higher pasture yields and animal loads in 
which confined operations are used part of the year.  The phosphorus concentration, 
however, varied only slightly, suggesting that in the absence of fertilization the broken 
terrain, uneven precipitation patterns, land cover and soil types are the main predictors of 
phosphorus contamination, not grazing intensity itself.  The current drive by the 
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government of Costa Rica to promote agricultural intensification could therefore be 
beneficial for the environment, provided that manure is managed appropriately during the 
animal confinement period.
Key words: tropical deforestation, hydrologic modeling, watershed management, 
water pollution, SWAT, Costa Rica.
3.2.2  Introduction
Tropical forests have been disappearing over the years as a consequence of 
unsustainable natural resource exploitation, imposing a threat against biodiversity 
conservation, clean drinking water supplies, and climate stability [1].  The purpose of this 
study was to model quantitatively the extent at which the conversion of forests into 
pastures can degrade the quality of surface water, as determined by the concentrations of 
sediment, phosphorus, and nitrogen, in a watershed located in North-West Costa Rica.  
Deforestation in that country has been driven primarily by the expansion of grassland to 
raise cattle, in part to satisfy international beef markets.  Other tropical nations facing 
challenging deforestation dilemmas, like Brazil, attribute most of their forest loss to the 
same phenomenon [2].
The Nosara watershed was chosen for the study because: 1) pasture and forest in 
that area share several borders and they are currently the dominant land uses; 2) the 
expansion of grassland into forested land is viable (part of the forest is on flat terrain and 
it is not under a strict preservation status); 3) the area is accessible and therefore allows 
for a good understanding of how land is managed; and 4) the watershed and its associated 
receiving body (the Pacific Ocean) have significant and diverse economic activities, 
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including tourism, agriculture, and fishing, making the case more relevant for future 
multi-disciplinary work.
The study utilized the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to estimate the 
concentration of the three pollutants at the outlet of the river basin under different ratios 
of forest to pasture within the watershed.  The use of SWAT in developing countries is 
fairly recent and infrequent [3].  The present study is not only unique for being centered 
in a tropical and developing country, where deforestation is a critical issue, but it is also 
novel in that it specifically investigates the impact of converting increasing amounts of 
land from forest into pasture, allowing for a quantitative estimation of river water quality 
under several hypothetical scenarios, including the re-allocation of grasslands to areas of 
low erodibility, and the use of different cattle stocking rates.
3.2.3 Materials and methods
SWAT is a hydrological model for river basins that has been widely and 
successfully used during the past decade [4].  To set-up the model, twenty years of daily 
maximum and minimum temperatures and rainfall going from 1984 through 2003, and 
digital land cover and soils maps were obtained from diverse institutions in Costa Rica 
[5,6,7].  Soils were re-classified according to the US Natural Resources Conservation 
Service system and they were formatted for SWAT using published methods [8].  The 
digital elevation map was taken from the US Geological Survey [9].
The main basin outlet is the point where the Nosara river flows into the Pacific 
Ocean.   The watershed has an area of 34,500 ha, an elevation that goes from sea level to 
950 m above sea level, and a sub-tropical climate with a total average annual rainfall of 
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2150 mm and average maximum and minimum temperatures of 33 °C and 21 °C, 
respectively.  Primary and secondary forests account for 52% of the area, while 47.5% is
under pastures or range.  The other 0.5% corresponds to urban areas, wetlands and 
permanent crops.  The watershed was divided into 22 sub-basins and 116 hydrologic 
response units (HRUs).  Figure 3.1 shows the land-cover map, sub-basins, and main 
channels.  Details about grassland management practices in the area were obtained by 
directly interviewing several ranchers during August of 2004.
Figure 3.1: Land-cover map
A study that includes four flow measurements in one stream within the basin was 
used to calibrate the model by varying diverse parameters governing different processes 
of the hydrologic cycle [10].  Figure 3.2 shows the points and line of best fit for a plot of 
predicted vs. measured flows after calibration, with a regression coefficient of 0.9886.
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Figure 3.2:  Model calibration
The model was run for the baseline land cover, for the entire area in forest, and 
then as pasture, using different stocking rates.
3.2.4 Results and discussion
The baseline concentrations for sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus were 247 
mg/L, 3.75 mg/L and 0.85 mg/L, respectively.  A comparison of the runs with the whole 
watershed as pasture and then as forest allowed for the ranking of the 116 HRUs 
according to the predicted increase in sediment concentration when the HRU is 
deforested.  Figure 3.3 shows the result of that comparison, with the three graphs having 
the same HRU ranking. 
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Figure 3.3:  Effect of deforestation on pollutant concentration
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The left of graph 3.3a corresponds to areas that increase the sediment 
concentration only marginally when they are converted from forest to pasture, while 
those on the right increase it to a larger extent.  Pastures are more erodible than forests 
and cattle grazing, biomass trampling and manure deposition increase sediment run-off in 
different proportions for different combinations of soil type and slope.
Similar observations can be drawn from graphs 3.3b and 3.3c for the nitrogen and 
phosphorus concentrations.  Sediment contains nutrients primarily in organic and 
insoluble form, and therefore an increase in its concentration also tends to increase the 
concentration of total nitrogen and phosphorus.  However, even where deforestation does 
not increase sediment run-off, soluble nitrogen and phosphorus will increase with pasture 
conversion due to higher surface water flow.
Figure 3.3 suggests that going from a watershed that is totally forested to one that 
is totally under pasture would increase the concentration of sediment at the main outlet by 
approximately 5 times, the concentration of nitrogen by 3.5 times and the concentration 
of phosphorus 8 times.  If the current area under pasture was relocated to the less erodible 
HRUs, the concentrations of sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus would be 156 mg/L, 3.27 
mg/L and 0.67 mg/L, respectively, as read from the graphs presented.  That would result 
in decreases of 37%, 13% and 21%, respectively, compared to the baseline simulation.
Figure 3.4 shows the sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations when the 
entire area is pasture, for two sets of grazing parameters corresponding to two very 
different ways of managing pastures: a low stocking rate of 0.86 animals/ha and a high 
stocking rate of 3 animals/ha.  In the first case cattle are left to graze the entire year and 
during the dry season there is over-grazing and pasture almost disappears, with tracts of 
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land turning into exposed bare soil.  Sediment and nitrogen run-off are high under those 
conditions.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of stocking rates on pollutant concentrations
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The second case is representative of farms that have been influenced by the drive 
from the government of Costa Rica to promote agricultural intensification to improve 
productivity and earnings for the farmer.  Ranches are divided into five areas were cattle 
graze one week at a time, allowing for higher grass (and cattle) yields.  Animals are taken 
out of the pasture during the four months of dry season and they are placed in a confined 
feeding operation, which was not included in the model, to reflect the practice by many 
farmers of treating manure in lagoons or selling it as fertilizer.  Figure 4 shows that the 
high stocking rate can actually decrease sediment concentration by 40% and nitrogen 
concentration by 11%.  Agricultural intensification in the watershed can result in lower 
pollutant loads.  
The phosphorus concentration varied only marginally from the first case to the 
second, due to the sensitivity of the model, the soils characteristics, and because that 
nutrient is always in excess in the system, independent from the duration or intensity of 
grazing.  There were no phosphorus stress days in the simulation, while nitrogen was the 
limiting plant growth factor 86 days during the year on average.  Even with a decrease in 
sediment run-off, more grazing translates into increased phosphorus deposition, at a rate 
higher than the uptake by plants.  Fertilization is not used in the area.
3.2.5 Conclusions
The results of this study demonstrated that tropical deforestation can be 
accompanied by a significant increase in river chemical pollution.  Studies in the US have 
recommended maximum concentrations of total suspended solids that go from 100 mg/L 
to 25 mg/L for recreational waters, primarily with the intention of protecting aquatic life 
58
[11].  The sediment concentration at the outlet of Nosara, both for the baseline simulation 
and for the case of total deforestation are significantly higher than those recommended 
maximum limits.  Tourism is by far the most important industry of the area, and that 
economic activity could be negatively affected if deforestation-driven pollution is not 
controlled.
In the case of the total nitrogen concentrations, both the value for complete 
deforestation and for the baseline land cover are below the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) standard for drinking water of 11 mg/L (as total nitrogen), 
and the World Health Organization (WHO) standard for short exposure of 53 mg/L, but 
the WHO establishes a maximum limit of only 0.2 mg/L for long term exposure [12].  
Moreover, some of the HRUs generated total nitrogen concentrations of up to 10.4 mg/L.  
In the watershed more than 2500 individuals take their drinking water directly from 
creeks and rivers with no treatment.
Phosphorus can cause eutrophication, and although general recommendations 
from the WHO or the USEPA do not exist in terms of maximum concentrations for 
recreational waters, the values estimated for Nosara are very high.
No measurements for river sediment and nutrient concentration in the watershed 
have been published, and therefore comparisons to reference data were not performed, 
suggesting that the specific absolute values predicted by the model should be used with 
prudence.  In spite of that limitation, the ratios and percent changes estimated in the study 
showed that agricultural intensification can decrease river chemical pollution provided 
that manure is treated and/or removed from the watershed during the cattle confinement 
period.  The project also proved that implementing policies that would restrict grasslands 
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to the areas of lower erodibility can significantly decrease pollution, even if the total 
pasture area remains constant.
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3.3 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that agricultural intensification may be a viable solution to 
increase the production of beef in Costa Rica while at the same time improving 
environmental performance.  However, the Ministry of Agriculture needs to do more to 
make that happen by, for example, providing credit for the purchase of better pasture 
seeds, and offering technical support for helping ranchers deal with manure in a 
responsible way.  The use of fertilizers in grasslands is uncommon in Costa Rica.  A 
possible extension of this work would consist in analyzing the potential effect of reducing 
61
area under pasture but intensifying grazing further by using fertilizers.  Both bio-physical 
and economic studies around that subject could be conducted.
Further refining of models such as the one presented in this first paper included in 
Section 3.2 will be possible after government agencies install gages in rivers other than 
those suitable for hydroelectric power.  The present study has shown the importance of 
analyzing the hydrology of the country with purposes other than energy generation.  
Periodic measurement of nutrients would also be helpful to allow for the calibration of 
the model and to expand its predictive accuracy.  And finally, SWAT itself is subject to 
improvements and expansions.  The inclusion of tropical soils in its databases would 
enable a faster and more methodical model set-up and the expansion of the crops 
database with different types of trees (beyond deciduous and perennial forest) and crops 
would generate more accurate results.  There is certainly an opportunity for agencies 
from industrialized and developing countries to cooperate in building better, farther 
reaching hydrologic models.
The study presented here could also be expanded by utilizing flood prediction 
software to compare scenarios, and by including biological pollutants, like biochemical
oxygen demand.  Furthermore, each HRU could be analyzed independently with respect 
to its energy and mass balances for each pollutant, and soluble and organic nitrogen and 
phosphorus could be examined separately.
Studying the pollution effects of various forest/pasture ratios in the watershed 
offers only a partial understanding of the problem of reforestation.  The economic 
dimension is always essential, and it is explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC MODEL
4.1  Introductory comments
This second paper utilizes some of the results from the biophysical model to 
analyze the problem of deforestation from the economic perspective.  The article uses an
optimization model to determine the forest/pasture ratio in Nosara that maximizes social 
welfare, under different conditions.
The general framework for the study is Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), which has 
been a widely used, and also criticized, technique during the past several decades.  For 
example, Lewis (2002) states that conventional markets have trouble dealing with 
irreversible changes, non-priced goods and the long time lag between cause and effect in 
ecosystems.  Van der Straaten (2002) mentions that it is difficult to value nature when the 
opinion of future generations can not be accounted for, and Lumley (2002) affirms that 
CBA is about efficiency, but not necessarily equity.
However, the use of CBA has several advantages: it is a favored method in most
policy cycles; it allows for a comparison of alternatives based on one consistent variable; 
it is a key and necessary step in any policy analysis, particularly in developing countries 
where the implementation cost of any public measure needs to be carefully weighted
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 against its benefits; and in this study it is not the only perspective that was considered.  
Any public policy can make sectors in society better-off and some others worse-off.  
Decisions based on CBA necessarily imply that redistributive or compensatory
mechanisms can be implemented to minimize harm to those that could be negatively 
affected.  Nevertheless, a detailed discussion about social equality at the national level 
within Costa Rica is beyond the scope of this project.
The model was set-up in Excel in such a way that its Solver function selects the 
land cover for each HRU as pasture or forest by trying to maximize total societal gains, 
subject to a maximum allowed pollution output.  The model will therefore tend to 
allocate pasture in HRUs that generate less pollution.  The economic data were obtained 
from interviews conducted on site during 2004 and from published information.  The 
pollution data came from the biophysical model.
It was assumed in this second paper that the potential per area gains from cattle 
production are constant from one HRU to the next.  In practice that may not be the case, 
because different soils and slopes will result in different pasture and cattle yields and 
perhaps different expenses for the farmer.  However, an inspection of the files generated 
by SWAT revealed that changes in biomass yield from one HRU to the next are only 
between 17% and 30%, perhaps because SWAT uses an average slope per sub-basin for 
all HRUs.  Also, higher biomass yields do not necessarily translate into higher animal 
yields, because grasses are different and after a certain biomass yield animals can not 
consume more.  The biophysical model was based on a constant stocking rate across all 
pastures in the watershed, and therefore there would be no proper association between 
pollution levels predicted from SWAT for each HRU and economic data that assumes 
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different animal yields (and per area profits) in each HRU in this second paper.  Finally, 
the budget from which farmer profits were calculated is for a typical ranch, and it is clear 
that this may also vary from one farm to the next due to an array of reasons.  Therefore 
the assumption of constant per area returns from ranching is reasonable, particularly 
considering the many other uncertainties and assumptions included in the development of 
the model.
To include spatial variability for profits, the researcher would have to explore the 
biomass yield in each HRU and establish a relationship between biomass and profit.  The 
stocking rate for each HRU would have to be adjusted to reflect the maximum carrying 
capacity of each area.  Then SWAT would have to be run again, because changes in the 
stocking rate would alter the nutrient cycling in the system, resulting in new biomass 
yields, which would require another adjustment in stocking rates.  Such an iterative 
process may result in a more realistic estimation of the maximum profits that can be 
achieved by the private sector in Nosara under different land cover schemes. 
4.2  Determinants of optimal tropical forest/pasture ratios in the Costa Rican North 
Pacific
4.2.1 Summary 
This project analyzed the potential effect of several factors on the proportion of 
forested land that maximizes net social welfare in a watershed in the North-West of Costa 
Rica.  The ability of landowners to generate high profits from increasing amounts of 
forested land is the most important determinant of the optimum land cover distribution.  
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Under conditions of high profitability from private preserves, the current governmental 
forest subsidy is adequate to promote conservation.  Under conditions of low 
profitability, both an increase in the per area subsidy and an increase in the property taxes 
for grasslands can accomplish meaningful conservation.
Key words – Latin America, Costa Rica, deforestation, forest conservation, 
economic policy
4.2.2  Introduction
Tropical forests have an immense value for providing humanity with dozens of 
environmental services that include carbon storage, soil conservation, bio-prospecting, 
water storage, and others (Castro & Barrantes, 1999; Ramirez, 2000).  However, their 
livelihood continues to be threatened by continued falling of trees across the tropics to 
make room for cattle grazing, crop growing, urbanization and other uses.  Productive land 
should not be expanded at the expense of forested land when the opportunity cost of 
doing so is greater than that of reallocating productive lands to more valuable uses (Lutz 
& Daly, 1991).  Conversely, it makes sense to reforest if the net present value of such an 
undertaking is higher than that of exploiting the land in a different manner.  The decision-
making process of a landowner includes only aspects pertaining to his/her own economic 
transactions, therefore policy-makers need analyses to understand which resource use 
provides higher benefits for society at large, so they can implement regulatory 
instruments to influence the private sector in directions that increase social welfare.  The 
purpose of this study was to estimate the optimum proportion of forested land in a 
watershed in the North-West of Costa Rica, on the basis of the net economic benefits it 
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could provide under different scenarios.  The study also aimed at explaining and 
comparing the possible effect of different benefits and costs on that optimum, and at 
describing the potential consequences of alternative policies.
Costa Rica represents an interesting case to study economic policy for forest 
preservation.  During the mid-1980s the country had the highest deforestation rate in the 
world, primarily because of an accelerated expansion of pastures to raise cattle for 
international markets (Brown, 1990; Esposito, 2002; Evans, 1999; Goodstein, 2002).  By 
the mid-1990s pastures covered about 47% of the territory, while some 40% of it was still 
forested (Brockett & Gottfried, 2002).  In 1996 the Forestry Law Amendments created 
the Environmental Service Payment (ESP): an annual, per hectare subsidy to forest 
owners for the environmental services their land provides (Sagot, 2000).  Subsidies for 
reforestation and for sustainable forest exploitation were also created.  Pastureland 
decreased from an all time high of 2.4 million ha to 1.35 million ha in 2000, in part 
because of the ESP, but also because of a decrease in international beef prices 
(Corporación de Fomento Ganadero, 2000).
The future of reforestation in private lands is uncertain.  The push of the 
government for trade liberalization may result in new beef markets opening up for Costa 
Rican producers.  Although the Forestry Law prohibits further clearing of private lands, 
visual observations and studies have shown that pastures on highly erodible land remain 
(Benavides & Veenstra, 2005).  Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture is in general 
promoting agricultural intensification.  On the other hand, a draft bill intended to 
augment the budget of the ESP through a new tax on potable water has been waiting for 
approval in Congress for several years.  If that bill is eventually signed into law, the best 
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way to utilize the new funds needs to be analyzed.  What influences the optimal level of 
forest cover in Costa Rica?  Is the ESP an effective mechanism to promote conservation?  
This study intended to shed some light on those inquiries, and on the general challenge of 
promoting tropical forest conservation in the developing world.
Previous research related to land use alternatives in Costa Rica includes the work 
by Schipper et al. (1998), who compared the output from different combinations of 
agricultural and forest commodities on the basis of production costs and local sale prices.  
They concluded that an annual conservation subsidy of $122/ha would increase the 
forested area in the North Atlantic zone at the expense of pasture by 50%, while a 
subsidy of $133/ha would increase it by 120%.  Changes in the discount rate had little 
effect on the optimal land-use pattern.  They did not consider indirect costs and benefits, 
or the potential earnings from exploiting the forest as a tourist attraction.  Estimates by 
Ramirez (2000) indicated that the highest net present value from a 
reforestation/conservation project can be achieved if monetary compensation for carbon 
sequestration was received during the first 11 years of forest re-generation followed by a 
one-time payment for carbon storage.  The total value per hectare of forest would be 
about $1000, but this is less than the typical farm value in Costa Rica today which is 
about $2400/ha (White, Holmann, Fujisaka, Reategui, & Lascano, 1999).
The present study was based on the Nosara watershed, where 47.5% of the 34,447 
hectares are under pasture, 52% under forest, including a privately owned preserve, and 
the remaining 0.5% of the area includes permanent crops, wetlands and small towns.  The 
basin outflows into the Pacific Ocean.  The analysis that follows included not only rent 
from the land and potential subsidies, but also other factors that could change as a 
68
function of different proportions of forest and pasture in the area due to varying pollutant 
concentrations in its rivers (Benavides & Veenstra, 2005)1: the rent from tourism at the 
coast and from nearby fisheries; the aesthetic, water and carbon storage, existence and 
option values of the forest; and the cost of drinking water for residents in the watershed.
The paper offers a conceptual framework in Section 4.2.3, in which all the 
variables and their relationships are defined, and their values are reported and justified.  
An explanation for how the optima were determined is given.  Section 4.2.4 includes the 
major results, first for the economic analysis based on the net benefits for the Costa Rican 
society as a whole, and then for the financial analysis from the perspective of the 
landowners.  The potential effect of subsidies and taxes is explored.  Section 4.2.5
summarizes the major conclusions and provides suggestions for future research.
4.2.3  Conceptual framework
4.2.3.1 Economic model
The watershed was divided into 116 hydrologic response units (HRUs) in the 
construction of a biophysical model that estimated pollutant output from each of those 
area units according to their land cover (Benavides & Veenstra, 2005).  Each HRU is a 
specific combination of a soil type, land cover and slope.  A social welfare function is 
constructed by adding the profit from managing each HRU either as a pastureland or as a 
forest, subject to a given maximum allowable pollution level, and by adding other 
benefits and subtracting costs according to the following equation:
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Where:
W = discounted net benefit from managing the watershed according to a given 
pasture/forest land distribution;
t = time.  The analysis is conducted for 20 years because current ESP contracts cover 
an identical period;
r = net social discount rate.  It was taken as 2%, 5% and 8%;
i = HRU subscript;
P = annual per hectare profit from exploiting the land as a pasture to raise cattle.  Its 
value is $62.60 and it was calculated from reviewing budgets of typical farms in 
the area in 2004;
A = area, in ha, of each HRU;
X = a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the HRU is pasture and 0 otherwise;
Y = a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the HRU is forest and 0 otherwise;
F = annual per hectare profit from exploiting the land as a preserve and charging 
visitors an entry fee.  Its initial value of $32.76 was taken from the 2004 budget of 
the only preserve currently located within the watershed.  The profit is assumed 
proportional to the number of visitors, which have been increasing every year 
since the preserve’s creation.  A polynomial extrapolation provided the value for 
subsequent years, until year 7, when the preserve attains its maximum visitor 
carrying capacity, and the profit is estimated at $102.3.  However, a linear profit-
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area relationship is not realistic (it would imply that doubling the size of a 
preserve would double the profits), and that is why F was multiplied by the total 
area of forested land raised to the power ;
 = area “elasticity” of preserve profit, which was assigned the values of 0.85, 0.90, 
0.91, 0.92 and 0.93 in different optimizations;
O = annual per hectare estimated value of forest benefits other than the direct use 
values, and it includes for example carbon and water storage, aesthetic, option and 
existence values.  The parameter was taken as constant over time, and equal to the 
amount the government is currently willing to pay owners for the environmental 
services their forests provide: $34.68 (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento 
Forestal, 2005)2.  Again, whether those benefits are directly proportional to area 
forested or not is debatable, and that is why variable  was included;
 = area “elasticity” of environmental benefit, which was assigned the values of 0.8, 
0.9 and 1;
Q = annual per hectare cost of drinking water for the 2500 people in the watershed 
who take the water directly from rivers and creeks with no treatment, and 
therefore could be affected by changes in its quality.  It was assumed that when 
the nitrate concentration in the water within a given HRU is below 7 mg/l, 
residents will pay the rate charged by a rural aqueduct that works by gravity, 
according to the approved rates published by the corresponding government 
authority in Costa Rica (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, 
2004).  The standard of 7 mg/l is 70% of the maximum recommended nitrate 
concentration in drinking water as published by the United States Environmental 
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Protection Agency (2004).  When the concentration is above that level, it was 
assumed that the rural aqueduct would have to be sourced from a more distant 
location, requiring pumping, for which a higher rate applies.  A water 
consumption of 75 m3 per year per person was used, and the rural population was 
assumed to be homogeneously spread across the watershed3.  Q takes the value of 
$1.19 for the gravity system and $2.01 for the pumped system;
M = yearly profit from the marine fisheries that could be affected by pollution coming 
from the watershed.  Its value changed less than 25% from year to year during the 
past decade, and therefore it was taken as the average from the period going from 
1992 through 1998, or $2,249,000 (Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura, 
2004).  The extent to which catch (and corresponding earnings) would be affected 
by pollution is difficult to estimate and has not been studied for Nosara, although 
previous research has shown that increases in the pasture cover at the expense of 
forest increase the concentration of sediment, nitrate and phosphorus at the outlet 
of the watershed, and that can impair aquatic life (Benavides & Veenstra 2005);
 = percent change in earnings from fisheries for a 1% change in the fraction of the 
watershed under pasture.  The values tested for  included 0.05, 0.15 and 0.25;
R = fraction of the watershed under pasture;
Ro = baseline pasture fraction, which equals 0.475 (Benavides & Veenstra 2005);
Nt = yearly revenue from tourism at the coast, which has been increasing during the 
past decade and therefore it was taken as the linear projection in revenues from 
the area hotels from 1994 through 2003 (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, 
2004).  The value for year 1 of the simulation equals $218,000 and for year 20 it 
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equals $471,000.  No obvious limits to that growth exist in terms of space for new 
hotels.  The demand for recreation at the coast is expected to decrease with 
increasing area covered by pasture, because of aesthetic reasons, and also because 
increasing pollution at the coast;
 = percent change in tourism revenues for a 1% change in the fraction of the 
watershed under pasture.  The values of  that were tested include 0.4, 0.5 and 
0.6.
Pastures can also be expected to have lower rainfall infiltration rates: their soils 
are less permeable due to compacting from the cows, there is less rainwater interception 
in the absence of trees, and therefore during strong rain events the probability of having a 
flood could increase if the pasture cover increases at the expense of forests (Brooks, 
1997).  However, the historical information available regarding the costs of response and 
reconstruction due to floods is very limited and it has been reported in varying formats 
that do not allow for a consistent estimation of the monetary expenses corresponding to 
the watershed under study.  Those costs were therefore not included in the model.
Equation (1) is subject to the constraints that all variables are positive, and that 
the total sediment concentration S at the outlet of the watershed be less than or equal to a 
certain value.  The sediment concentration was chosen as the pollution variable, because 
it is the most relevant in terms of potential negative effects for aesthetics, tourism and 
aquatic life (Brooks, 1997).  For a given value of S, the solution of equation (1) is 
calculated by selecting for each land unit i its cover (pasture or forest), or equivalently, 
by assigning Xi and Yi the value of 0 or 1, in such a way that the total net social welfare 
is the maximum possible.  Subsequent changes in S will give way to new solutions with a 
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certain total percent area under pasture and a certain value of W.  S can take values 
between 83 mg/l, corresponding to a watershed that is entirely covered by forest, and 414 
mg/l, corresponding to a watershed that is totally covered by grassland (Benavides & 
Veenstra 2005).
4.2.3.2 Financial model
From the point of view of the landowner, only the net rent from exploiting the 
land and any government taxes or subsidies are relevant.  The new objective function is 
as follows: 
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In equation (2), O becomes the annual per hectare environmental service payment 
(subsidy) that can be given to owners of forested land.  In addition to the baseline of 
$34.68, three alternative values were tested: $39.01, $43.35 and $52.02, corresponding to 
increases of 12.5%, 25% and 50% above the baseline, respectively.  The third term in the 
numerator in equation (2) is subject to a constraint that it be less than or equal to a certain 
hypothetical budget B that the government would have, and that was chosen in different 
optimizations as the equivalent to what would be needed to subsidize 25% of the 
watershed, 50%, and 75%.  The total amount of money needed to provide the subsidy to 
25% of the land at the current per area rate is about $299,000 per year, which is feasible 
considering current budgets, past practices, and how this financial support has been 
managed up to now (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal, 2005).
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In the financial analysis, the profit P of exploiting land as a pasture for cattle 
grazing was modified by testing different rates of property tax .  Currently, landowners 
pay as property tax the equivalent to 1% of the land value per year.  The current land 
value in Nosara is around $2,262.00/ha, according to residents of the area.  The values of 
 tested included 1%, 2%, 3%, 4% and 5%, for corresponding values of P of $62.60, 
$57.48, $52.36, $47.25 and $42.13.
The models represented by equations (1) and (2) were both programmed in 
Microsoft Excel, and they were solved using the software’s non-linear solver.  All 
monetary values used and reported are in 2004 US dollars.  The major results appear in 
the next section.
4.2.4  Results and discussion
4.2.4.1 Economic model
Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between net discounted social welfare W and 
percent area in pasture, for different values of the area elasticity  of preserve profit.  For 
all other variables the mid values were selected to plot the figure: =0.9, r=5%, =0.15 
and =0.5.  When =0.85, an increase in the size of a forest preserve results in only a 
modest increase in return, compared to the opportunity of keeping the land under pasture 
to raise cattle, and therefore moving from right to left on the graph W decreases rapidly.  
The optimum corresponds to 100% pasture.  However, as  increases, the corresponding 
value of W for 0% pasture becomes larger and larger, and the optimum shifts towards the 
left:  for =0.9 the optimum is 92% pasture, for =0.91 it is 83%, when =0.92 it is 46% 
and the difference between W at 100% forest and at 0% forest is the smallest (about 
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$500,000), and finally when =0.93, W is maximum at a percent cover under pasture of 
0% and at that point the per area net discounted benefit is $1744/ha.
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Figure 4.1.  Effect of the area elasticity of profit preserve on the relationship between 
social welfare and area under pasture.
The extent to which new forested areas managed as private preserves could 
generate a profit similar to the one in operation today within Nosara is a major factor in 
defining what the optimum forest cover would be, from the perspective of a watershed 
manager or regulator.  For subsequent results within the economic analysis,  was fixed 
at 0.93.
Figure 4.2 shows the effect of the area elasticity of environmental benefit  on the 
relationship between net social welfare and percent area under pasture.  Higher values of 
 increase W for any given percent area under pasture, except for 100%, where W is 
fixed for any value of  because no significant environmental benefits are accounted for 
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when the watershed is entirely grassland.  Changes in this elasticity do shift the optimum.  
Taking =0.9 as a baseline, a decrease to 0.8 changes the optimum from 0% pasture to 
82%, and an increase to =1.0 keeps the optimum at 0% pasture but it increases W from 
about $60 million to about $70 million.  The extent to which increasing forest cover 
provides declining returns from environmental services accounted for in variable O is a 
significant factor in calculating the optimum proportion of forest and pasture.  For 
subsequent estimations,  was fixed at 1.0.
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Figure 4.2.  Effect of the area elasticity of other environmental benefits on the 
relationship between social welfare and area under pasture.
Table 4.1 summarizes the results for all the other parameters tested in the 
economic model.  In all cases, under all combinations of , , and r, the optimum is 100% 
forest.  Varying , the parameter that relates changes in fishing earnings to changes in 
land cover, only modifies W by about $1.4 million at the optimum.  The effect of , the 
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variable that relates changes in tourism earnings at the coast to changes in land cover, is 
even less pronounced: it changes W by only about $200,000.  Earnings from tourism are 
significantly lower than earnings from fishing, and that explains why the model is more 
sensitive to  than .  Finally, the net social discount rate r, when decreased from 5% to 
2%, increases W by more than $20 million, because future profits are worth more in the 
present when r is lower.  Consequently, when r is increased from 5% to 8%, W decreases 
by more than $14 million, and the present value of future profits is lower.
Table 4.1.  Effect of fisheries, tourism and discount rate on the optimum percent cover 
under pasture and corresponding social welfare.
Variable Values tested Optimum percent cover 
under pasture (%)
Net Social Welfare W ($)
0.05 0 69,029,719
0.15 0 70,427,893

0.25 0 71,826,066
0.4 0 70,015,967
0.5 0 70,221,930

0.6 0 70,427,893
2 0 92,740,377
5 0 71,826,066
r
8 0 57,450,633
Note: in all cases =0.93 and =1.0
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4.2.4.2 Financial model
The effect of the total subsidy budget B for the watershed at two different area 
elasticities  for preserve profit is presented in Table 4.2.  When  is high (0.93), the 
optimum amount of land preserved as a forest from the point of view of the private sector 
is directly related to B.  If the government has a budget equivalent to what is needed to 
provide subsidies for 25% of the watershed, then the private sector maximizes returns by 
keeping 25% of the land under forest.  When B is 50% the optimum percent cover under 
forest is 50%, and a B of 75% “buys” the preservation of 75% of the watershed.  
Table 4.2.  Effect of the subsidy budget on the relationship between net profit and area 
under pasture.
 B Optimum percent cover 
under pasture (%)
Net Social Welfare W ($)
25% 75 38,611,901
50% 50 40,621,314
0.93
75% 25 42,420,342
25% 98 36,021,001
50% 98 36,021,001
0.85
75% 98 36,021,001
Note: in all cases r=2% and O=$34.68
Table 4.2 also shows that when  is high, as B increases the optimum value of net 
profit W also increases.  When B=75%, the net discounted profit per area is $1,231/ha.  
Under the optimistic scenario of a high , the current per area subsidy rate is sufficient to 
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promote conservation, and an increase in the subsidy budget would be able to keep more 
land forested4.
When  is low (0.85), and as long as the annual per hectare subsidy O is kept at 
$34.68, no meaningful amount of conservation can be achieved, regardless of the subsidy 
budget.  For all values of B, the optimum is to have 98% of the watershed as grassland, 
and at that point W is $36,021,001.  If  equaled 0.85, what could be done to motivate the 
private sector to conserve the forest?  Two other potential policies were tested: first 
increasing annual per hectare subsidy for forests, keeping B constant at 25% for each 
value of O, and then increasing the property tax for pastures.
Figure 4.3 shows how the net profit for the private sector changes as a function of 
percent area under pasture, for different values of the subsidy rate.  A 12.5% increase 
above the baseline raises O to $39.01, and it shifts the optimum from a pasture cover of 
98% to 94%, raising total discounted profit by about $90,000.  A further increase to 
$43.45 (a 25% change with respect to the initial O) makes 75% pasture the new optimum, 
with W=$36,423,579, and finally making O=$52.02 (a 50% increase over the baseline 
value) keeps the optimum at 25% forest, but raises W to $37,668,903.  Of the values 
tested, the last two achieve the preservation of 25% of the watershed, but the best option 
would be $43.45 because the government expenditure would be lower, and it would total 
about $374,000 per year (an increase of $75,000/yr above the baseline).  Increasing the 
subsidy rate above current values can be an effective way of promoting conservation in 
the area under the pessimistic scenario of a low .
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Figure 4.3.  Effect of the subsidy rate on the relationship between net profit and area 
under pasture.
The effect of raising the property tax on pastures in increments of 1% is shown in 
Figure 4.4.  In this series of optimizations, O is kept at $34.68 and B is kept at 25%.  An 
increase in  decreases net profit W for every percent area under pasture because higher 
taxes leave less money in the farmers’ pocket.  Changes in  also shift the optimum.  
Increasing the tax from 1% to 2% shifts the optimum from 98% pasture to 92% pasture.  
When =3% or higher, the optimum W corresponds to 25% of the watershed as forest.  
The best tax rate is therefore 3%, as long as it is combined with the subsidy, because 
higher tax rates would not increase the forested area beyond 25%.
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Figure 4.4.  Effect of the property tax on the relationship between net profit and area 
under pasture.
The effect of the discount rate was also tested during the financial analysis.  The 
results were similar to what was found in the economic analysis, in that higher values of r 
result in lower values of W at any percent pasture, without changing the optimum land 
cover distribution.
4.2.5 Conclusions
Of all the factors tested in this study, the ability of the private sector to generate 
profit from increasing amounts of forested land under preservation status is the most 
significant in predicting what the optimum land cover should be.  Forest reserves in 
private hands have been growing in Costa Rica throughout the years; to the point that 
today almost 500,000 ha fall into that classification, representing almost 10% of the total 
surface of the country (Villegas & Hernández, 2004).  Many of those properties have 
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ecotourism as their primary purpose, and they generate yearly rent that ranges from 
$21/ha to $90/ha depending on the number of services they offer5.  A policy aimed at 
promoting conservation should therefore consider providing tools to the rural landowners 
to help them succeed in managing a preserve in a highly profitable way.  Education and 
preferred lines of credit could be some of those tools.  High profits from exploiting a 
preserve translate into more money for the owner, potentially a higher supply of land for 
conservation, and therefore more environmental benefits for society.
With respect to non-market values, two opportunities exist.  First, aesthetic, 
option and existence values need to be measured in Costa Rica in a systematic and 
comprehensive way, utilizing techniques such as contingent valuation or others.  Very 
few isolated attempts have been made, resulting in measurements hard to extrapolate at a 
national level (Pierce & Moran, 1994).  And second, economic transactions for carbon 
sequestration and storage have in the past occurred, but again, in an isolated and 
inconsistent manner (Evans, 1999; Steinberg, 2001).  The ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol may open up new funding prospects for Costa Rica, as long as the country 
aggressively pursues them.  More accurate measurements of non-use values and the 
establishment of a stable carbon market would favor conservation.
  This study has shown that under conditions of high preserve profitability net 
social welfare increases as the forest cover increases.  It follows that promoting 
conservation makes sense, to the extent that the country is not forced to import beef in the 
future for lack of pastures, something that to a certain extent can be prevented through 
agricultural intensification.  We have also suggested that under those high profitability 
conditions the ESP is an effective mechanism to promote conservation at the current per 
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area rates and therefore new funds, if they became available from the proposed tax on 
potable water, would be better used to expand the area to be subsidized, instead of 
increasing the per area rate6.
About 80% of private preserves are today receiving the ESP.  Currently the 
number of applications is five times larger than the number of contracts being signed per 
year, which shows the interest of the private sector in that subsidy (Villegas & 
Hernández, 2004).  Those already owning a forest may simply be trying to increase their 
earnings through the ESP, but it remains to be seen if the subsidy will motivate a 
significant amount of the remaining ranchers to let their land recover back into a forest, 
particularly considering conversion costs.  A potential strategy for a rancher would be to 
apply for the reforestation subsidy first, reforest the farm in stages, and start offering 
tours to visitors as soon as the conversion starts.  A number of farmers have actually been 
successful in keeping small forested areas within their properties and offering horseback 
riding tours.  Visitors seem to be interested not only in the forested tracts, but also in 
learning about cattle raising and the local culture in general (Andrade, 2004).  That 
strategy would guarantee a relatively constant rent for the owner until the conversion to 
forest is completed.
Under conditions of low preserve profitability, both an increase in the per area 
ESP rate and the use of an increased property tax on pastures would promote 
conservation.  The difference would be in the policy and politics implications and the 
gains and losses of consumers’ surplus among different sectors of the economy and the 
government.
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The problem of deforestation in Costa Rica and the tropics in general is highly 
complex and dependent on more factors than one single study can cover.  Potential future 
trade agreements could open new markets for Costa Rican beef and move the financial 
analysis in favor of cattle production due to an increase in expected returns for the 
rancher, decreasing the flow of environmental benefits.  However, policy analysis is a 
dynamic phenomenon, and the use and adjustment of a regulatory instrument such as the 
ESP seems to be promising for promoting conservation in the developing world.
4.2.6  Notes
1.   Pastures generate more pollution into rivers compared to forests because the 
plant cover is sparser, the soil becomes more erodible to the effect of wind and rain, 
grazing by cattle generates debris, and part of the manure is transported by surface runoff 
to the rivers.  The study by Benavides & Veenstra (2005) modeled the effect of varying 
proportions of grassland and forest in Nosara on the concentrations of sediment, nitrogen 
and phosphorus at the outlet of the watershed.  
2.   The ESP rate for conservation is typically increased every year due to 
inflation.  Because of changing exchange rates, its value in US dollars varies.  For this 
study, the price of 2004 was utilized and it was converted into US dollars using the 
average exchange rate for that year.  Twenty percent was deducted from the resulting 
figure due to administrative and legal expenses that have to be borne by the recipient of 
the subsidy every year, and that includes for example audits by a third party forestry 
engineer.
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3.   The value of 75 m3 lies between what is considered optimum and what is 
considered the minimum acceptable by the World Health Organization (2003).  The 
water cost factor is relatively unimportant in the model, as it represents only about 1% to 
2% of the total net present value obtained from a typical optimization run.
4.   The figures reported in this paper for the potential net present value of 
managing tropical forests and pastures lie between ranges offered elsewhere (Pierce and 
Moran, 1994), but it is clear that current land values are higher than the expected rent 
from either land use.  Reasons like, tradition, being used to a way of life and lacking 
information about potential gains from alternative investments explain why some 
individuals would not consider anything other than raising cattle and they are not 
interested in selling their land.  On the other hand, individuals not driven by profit, 
primarily foreigners, who see themselves as conservationists, or who simply want to own 
a piece of the tropics as a long term investment are willing to pay $2,400/ha or more for a 
property around Nosara.
5.   This information, as well as many details about prices, costs and the managing 
of farms and forest preserves in Costa Rica was obtained from a series of conversations 
with landowners and administrators that took place, either in person, through the 
telephone or through email, during 2004.
6.   The studies by Schipper et al. (1998) and Ramirez (2000) came up with 
significantly higher figures for the subsidy rates that would promote conservation, 
because they did not include in their analysis the potential gains from exploiting a forest 
preserve as a tourist attraction.
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4.3  Concluding remarks
A detailed shadow price analysis is beyond the scope of this study and it was not 
included in the paper, which was written for a multi-disciplinary audience.  An inspection 
of the sensitivity reports generated by Excel from the optimizations in the economic 
model would allow for estimating the pollution based tax that would make society 
indifferent between keeping the land as forest and exploiting it for cattle production, 
under various scenarios.  The shadow prices varied between zero dollars per milligram of 
sediment per liter when pollution is not constraining, to $27,000/(mg/l) when the 
combination of variables is such that the profit from raising cattle is greatest compared to 
the profit from exploiting a forest preserve.
An alternative to a shadow price analysis is to use the financial model to explore 
the effect of a tax on pollution, instead of a tax on the land.  The results of those 
simulations are included in Appendix 2.  A tax on pollution would “punish” highly 
erodible, infertile, sloped farms more than those on flat, fertile areas, potentially forcing 
the most polluting to go out of business first.
It is worth noting that the decision-making process of the landowner does not 
obey a pure cost-benefit comparison.  Even with the existence of subsidies for 
conservation, some individuals decide to continue raising cattle in low productivity lands 
because of lack of information, customs, traditions and risk aversion.  This second paper 
has shown that it makes sense to maximize forested land if profits from exploiting the 
forest are high, but knowledge is needed to successfully and profitably manage a 
preserve.
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Another important consideration is the labor market.  Cattle raising requires about 
one full time employee for every 50 animals, or about a person per 50 ha.  The type and 
quantity of labor to manage a preserve can vary significantly.  The only private preserve 
within Nosara has two full time employees for over 400 ha, and on a monthly basis they 
earn an amount similar to what an individual working in a farm would make.  However, a 
preserve that includes a lodge, a restaurant, horseback riding tours and other amenities 
would require more personnel and a more specialized labor force.  
The economic study compared two land cover conditions in steady state: forest 
and pasture.  Conversion costs were not included in the analysis.  Deforestation in Costa 
Rica is banned under the Forestry Law, except with approved sustainable management 
plans for forest exploitation.  Reforestation on the other hand is what the tested policy 
instruments aim at achieving, but SWAT is not very suitable to model tree growth, and 
therefore it would be difficult to estimate pollution generation from the different HRUs 
during conversion from pasture to forest.  The paper however showed that from the 
economic point of view the conversion is feasible because the land owner can receive a 
reforestation subsidy and potentially obtain some rent from tourism while the conversion 
to forest is completed.  A detailed analysis that includes conversion costs would be a 
relevant addition to the project presented here.
Another way to further expand the study would be to test changes in other 
variables.  For example the category of “other environmental services” (variable O in 
Equation 2) could be refined and divided into potential gains from carbon sequestration, 
water storage, option, and existence values, etc.  That would require the design of surveys 
or other mechanisms to obtain the information.
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An alternative to preservation and to cattle raising is forest exploitation.  That 
third option could be included in an expanded land use analysis of the Costa Rican North-
West. Schipper et al. (1999) estimate that forests in Costa Rica can be exploited in a 
sustainable manner with a yield of 0.6 m3 of wood/ha.yr with an annual return of $16/ha.  
The value of wood in a plantation goes from about $179/m3 to about $10/m3 depending 
on the species and diameter of the tree (Cámara Costarricense Forestal 2003).  The yield 
of common species like teak in Costa Rica is significantly higher than the world average.  
During the 1980s and 1990s more than 170,000 ha of land were reforested for wood 
exploitation and currently that sector of the economy provides jobs to about 20,000 
people.  The future of wood exploitation in the country is nevertheless uncertain, due to a 
recent decrease in import taxes that is allowing material from Chile and Canada to be 
sold in the national market at relatively low prices.  Moreover, the average value of land 
for reforestation in Costa Rica is about $1,000/ha, while in neighboring countries like 
Nicaragua it is about $250/ha, making those countries more attractive to foreign timber 
companies (Barquero 2004).
In any case, the study of economic policy and the recommendation of a regulatory 
instrument based on an economic analysis are not sufficient to generate results.  This 
second paper has shown that under conditions of low preserve profitability both an 
increase in the ESP and in the tax on grasslands can achieve meaningful preservation.  
But which of those alternatives is better?  Which one is likely to enjoy wider acceptance 
if proposed in the Costa Rican Congress?  What would have to happen for such a policy 
to be implemented?  The next chapter answers those questions.
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CHAPTER V
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1   Introductory comments
This last paper describes the perceptions different stakeholders have about the 
problem of deforestation in Costa Rica and its potential solutions.  It then compares two 
of the regulatory instruments analyzed in the economic model according to a number of 
criteria, and finally it recommends the instrument that turns out to be superior.  The study 
is based on semi-structured interviews that were conducted during 2004 to fifteen 
individuals who represent different groups concerned with deforestation in the country
and that have historically played a prominent role in environmental policy-making in 
Costa Rica (Evans 1999).  The plan to conduct the interviews was filed at the Oklahoma 
State University Institutional Review Board, and their approval is included in Appendix 
3.  Furthermore, some of the questions utilized are listed in Appendix 4.
A discussion of policy implications is a key ingredient in any effort to propose a 
solution to a societal problem.  A recommendation based purely on environmental and 
economic modeling, without regard to matters such as political implementability and 
stakeholder acceptability would leave out essential considerations about the possibility of 
the policy to be approved and implemented successfully.
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However, policy analysis is a highly complex, non-linear, multi-disciplinary 
process.  The information presented and analyzed in this third paper is only a sample of a 
full-blown public policy study, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  For 
example, lengthy explanations about the causes of deforestation in Costa Rica, detailed 
justifications regarding the people who were chosen for the interviews, a thorough
validation of the policy comparison criteria and an exhaustive substantiation of the final 
policy ranking were not included in the paper.  Nonetheless, the information the 15 
interviewees provided shed some valuable clarification about the many dimensions of 
environmental policy-making in Costa Rica.
5.2 Strengthening conservation in the tropics: the water canon of Costa Rica
5.2.1  Abstract
This article analyzes a policy intended to augment the funds for subsidizing forest 
conservation in Costa Rica through a tax on the consumption of potable water.  The 
perceptions different stakeholders have toward the problem of deforestation and its 
potential solutions are described, and the potable water canon is compared on the basis of 
legitimacy criteria to the alternative of imposing a tax on the exploitation of marginal 
lands.  Overall, the water canon is a superior policy from the point of view of technical 
implementability and political feasibility.  The regulation is expected to increase the 
forest cover in private hands in a more effective way than the tax on marginal lands, 
while keeping government expenditures to a minimum.  The policy context is one of high 
expert and social trust, and low government trust, requiring substantive stakeholder 
education and the creation of feedback mechanisms to increase acceptability during the 
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implementation period.  If approved by the Costa Rican Congress, the water canon will 
become an innovative conservation policy from which other developing countries will be 
able to obtain valuable lessons.
Keywords:  Deforestation; Costa Rica; Conservation policy; Subsidies.
5.2.2  Introduction
The tropics are home to some of the last primary forests on Earth, many of which 
continue to disappear at an alarming speed, even though they have an immense value for 
providing society with an array of services such as carbon sequestration and storage, soil 
conservation, bio-prospecting, water storage, eco-tourism, and others (Castro and 
Barrantes, 1999; Ramirez, 2000).
Although 28% of the surface area in Costa Rica enjoys some type of preservation 
status, the country lost more than 50% of its forest cover during the last century 
(Esposito, 2002).  By the mid 1990s pastures covered about 47% of the territory, while 
some 40% of it was still forested (Brockett and Gottfried, 2002).  The government 
reacted with the 1996 amendments to the Forestry Law, which created the Environmental 
Service Payment (ESP), a subsidy to be given to owners of forested lands as a 
compensation for the services they provide to society at large.  During the past eight 
years, about 50% of pastures were left to recover into forest, perhaps due to the ESP, but 
also because of a fall in international beef prices that made cattle production a less 
profitable business (Corporación de Fomento Ganadero, 2000).  The extent to which the 
ESP has been an effective mechanism is questionable, considering that several pastures 
still exist today in fragile, highly erodible and sloped terrains (Castro and Barrantes, 
1999).  An insufficient ESP budget may be part of the problem.  Most of the funding 
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comes from a 3.5% tax on fossil fuels, but that can only subsidize one fifth of the current 
supply of land for conservation (Villegas and Hernández, 2004).  Moreover, the push by 
the government to sign free trade agreements may open up new markets for Costa Rican 
beef, and that could stop reforestation efforts and put pressure on the last remaining 
forested tracts in private hands.
The Environmental Affairs Commission of the Costa Rican Congress has recently 
completed a three year process that culminated in the draft bill “Law of the Hydrological 
Resource”.  The act would impose a tribute on the consumption of potable water, a 
“water canon” or tax whose revenues would be used in part to augment the budget for the 
ESP (Asamblea Legislativa, 2005).  The purpose of this article is to analyze that 
regulation as a solution to the problem of deforestation in Costa Rica, by comparing it to 
another option, based on aspects of technical practicability, economic efficiency, political 
feasibility, administrative implementability, and stakeholder acceptability (Clemons and 
McBeth, 2001), and subject to the perceptions or frames through which key stakeholders 
perceive the problem and its potential remedies (Bryson, 1995).  The analysis is based on 
a series of interviews that were conducted during 2004 and that included representatives 
from academia, the central government, municipal governments, national and local 
activists, ranchers, and owners of private preserves.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2.3 offers an explanation of the 
causes of deforestation in Costa Rica, Section 5.2.4 describes the views different 
stakeholders have about the problem, Section 5.2.5 lists the policy alternatives that were 
analyzed and compares them, and Section 5.2.6 presents a recommendation with a 
discussion about policy adoption considerations.
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5.2.3  The problem of deforestation in Costa Rica
In 1775 the governor of the province of Costa Rica, under Spanish rule at the 
time, issued a proclamation discouraging controlled burns on the basis that too much land 
was being cleared and causing soil sterility.  In 1846, several decades after independence, 
a decree stating the prohibition to cut trees near some key waterways was proclaimed 
(Steinberg, 2001).  The phenomenon of deforestation is not new.  It happens when a land 
owner chooses to cut the forest to make room for something else, or when squatters 
trespass on a property illegally for tree logging.  The following paragraphs describe some 
of the current land uses that compete with the forest in Costa Rica, and some of the 
factors that can influence a private owner towards conservation.
5.2.3.1 Illegal deforestation
Unlawful logging began to take on significant proportions in Costa Rica during 
the middle of the 20th century, due to population growth, the unstable job market in 
banana plantations, the lack of a rural development policy, and lax property rights.  In 
1941 a law would allow possession of up to 300 hectares of land as long as the occupant 
cleared at least half of it and maintained cattle at the minimum rate of one animal for 
every 5 hectares.  Those “improvements” would give the landholder a chance to obtain 
title, but many of them never cared to get their land registered (Brockett and Gottfried, 
2002).
In 1961 the Institute of Lands and Colonization was created to help individuals 
with no land who were looking for a place to live.  Tax sanctions were imposed on 
owners not cultivating their land (that regulation was not abolished until 1977), while 
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squatters were given access to some areas where they were allowed to practice 
agriculture.  The problem was not well controlled until the mid-1980s, when 
environmental education and fund raising were successful in helping those individuals 
relocate away from protected and privately owned areas (Evans, 1999).  Illegal 
deforestation in Costa Rica still occurs sporadically, but not as before.  The issue has 
been reduced to controllable levels and that is why its influence in the overall 
deforestation problem can be considered weak.
5.2.3.2 Urbanization
Urbanization was a major driver of deforestation during the first half of the 20th 
century in the Central Valley, where two thirds of Costa Ricans live and where political 
and industrial centers are located.  Outside of that region the weight of urbanization in the 
current landscape is not that significant.  Moreover, this phenomenon is not expected to 
be a determining factor for the future of the last remaining private forests, because the 
population is expected to cease growing later this century, (the fertility rate today is just 
at replacement level).  Immigration, often illegal, needs to be considered, but in the great 
scheme of things it is not expected to be a strong driver for the demand of urbanized land 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003).
5.2.3.3 Forestry
In 1987 the exportation of logs and unprocessed timber was banned, depressing 
domestic wood values to a fraction of international prices, weakening reforestation 
incentives, and subsidizing inefficient wood production industries (Hartwick and 
Olewiler, 1998; Southgate, 1995).  The government then established a reforestation and 
forest exploitation incentive to energize that activity, but pressure from non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs) has weakened that policy instrument.  Those who 
are interested in reforesting purely for conservation complain that the subsidies given are 
too small, while activists complain that forestry is profitable without any incentive and 
therefore tax-payers’ money should not be spent in subsidizing it.  According to the 
experts that were interviewed, although forestry continues being a viable economic 
activity in the country, it is no longer growing, primarily because the cost of land in Costa 
Rica has made it less profitable than before.
5.2.3.4 Agriculture
Coffee was the driver of Costa Rica’s economic development from the middle of 
the 19th century through the third quarter of the 20th century.  Bananas were introduced 
in the early 1900s, and agriculture was diversified in the 1950s.  Another diversification 
wave occurred in the 1980s with the introduction of fruits, flowers, and other “non 
traditional products” (Wilson, 1998).
The harsh reality of the international coffee and bananas markets has taken 
growers through violent ups and downs and it has forced some of them to go out of 
business.  In a monopsony with increasing producer competition prices can change 
drastically and growers are destined to loose.  Agriculture continues being an important 
economic activity in Costa Rica, but it has fallen behind tourism and manufacturing, and 
nowadays it no longer poses a significant threat against conservation (Brockett and 
Gottfried, 2002).
5.2.3.5 Pastures for raising cattle
All authors agree in that deforestation in Costa Rica has been driven primarily by 
the expansion of pastures to raise cattle to satisfy external beef markets (Brockett and 
99
Gottfried, 2002; Brown, 1990; Castro and Barrantes, 1999; Evans, 1999; Goodstein, 
2002; Lutz and Daly, 1991).  From 1956 to 1982 the funds used to provide credit to 
support ranching rose from 13.8% of total state credit to 23.3% (Lutz and Daly, 1991).
However, towards the end of the 1990s competition from other countries and a 
subsequent decrease in international prices forced a significant reduction in the 
production of cattle in Costa Rica.  Today the beef sector is hoping to grow its production 
again by differentiating its product under the category of “organic”, and by increasing 
exports after free trade agreements are signed.
The decision to reforest or not, or to deforest or not, is based on what the expected 
benefits of forested land are, as much as it is based on the expected benefits of deforested 
land.  A few of the benefits of conservation are explained below. 
5.2.3.6 Recreational values
Ecotourism emerged during the 1990s as a great incentive to conservation.  By 
1994 tourism as a whole was the major earner of foreign exchange (Brockett and 
Gottfried, 2002), and today that sector generates 20% of the country’s foreign income.  It 
represents 5% of Costa Rica’s gross domestic product, and it employs about 12% of its 
labor force (Rivera, 2002).
These days it is not uncommon for land owners to cater to ecotourists on their 
own forests.  On occasions, neighbor associations have joined forces to purchase small 
tracts of land for conservation and recreation.  That has represented a more stable source 
of income when compared to growing crops (Andrade, 2004).
Tourism of course has potential dangers associated with negative environmental 
impacts.  One attempt to prevent its possible damaging effects was the creation in 1997 of 
100
a Certification of Sustainable Tourism (CST) by the Costa Rican Tourism Board (ICT), 
which is a performance-based, voluntary environmental program.  CST was designed by 
a partnership of academic institutions, the major hotel trade association, and some 
environmental NGOs.  By 1999 115 hotels had decided to enroll in the program and 52 
had been audited and given a rating.  By 2000 ICT began including CST in its 
international advertisements, and the World Tourism Organization decided to adopt the 
Costa Rican program as its voluntary environmental certification (Rivera, 2002). 
5.2.3.7 Bio-prospecting
In Costa Rica national parks have a relatively low human impact and they are well 
suited for research, contrary to the case of most of the US, Europe or Africa.  In 1992-
1993, Merck paid $1 million to the National Biodiversity Institute (INBIO) for an 
agreement to conduct research on potential drugs derived from the country’s biodiversity 
to cure a few specific diseases (Evans, 1999).  Other bio-prospecting deals are underway, 
and both state owned and private preserves regularly host researchers and charge them 
fees.  The 1997 Biodiversity Law was aimed at conserving biodiversity, promoting its 
sustainable use as a resource, and distributing in a fair manner its associated costs and 
benefits.  The law declares that biodiversity is the property of the state (Sagot, 2000).
5.2.3.8 Carbon sequestration and storage
Up to 70% of the benefits from forest preservation in Costa Rica accrue to the 
global community through carbon sequestration (Brockett and Gottfried, 2002).  This is 
where the “debt for nature swaps” and other similar initiatives come to play.  The swaps 
were an idea proposed by a group of international environmental NGOs that were 
successful at enlisting the participation of a few donor governments and several 
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recipients.  During the early stages of that program fifteen countries participated and 
Costa Rica alone obtained one third of all the funds, in part because it had a significant 
institutional capacity and a large network of NGOs willing to help and put pressure on 
the government.  By 1991, over $40 million had been erased from the country’s debt 
through that mechanism (Keohane, 1996; Steinberg, 2001).
The Costa Rican Office for Joint Implementation (OCIC) was created during the 
mid-1990s for the issuance of carbon bonds to be traded following the scheme proposed 
by the Kyoto protocol.  A few transactions have already taken place:  in 1997 Norway 
paid Costa Rica two million dollars for the sequestration of 200,000 tons of carbon.  The 
following year, the Dutch government received a carbon bond equivalent to $673,000 it 
paid for projects aimed at reducing methane emissions, and the next year they put up 
another $334,000 for carbon fixation.  Twenty year carbon storage certificates issued by 
Costa Rica, valued at between $40 and $80 million, are currently being marketed at the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol may bring 
several buyers in the near future (Ramirez, 2000). 
5.2.3.9 Government incentives
The 1996 amendments to the Forestry Law resulted in the creation of new 
incentives for conservation that were established to compensate landowners for the 
environmental services provided by their forested lands.  The environmental service 
payment is offered at a rate of $510 per hectare for reforestation, to be given during the 
first five years of a 20 year contract.  For sustainable forest management the rate is 
$310/ha, and finally $230/ha are paid for forest preservation and natural regeneration for 
five year contracts (Brockett and Gottfried, 2002).  Many of the recipients of those 
102
payments are NGOs.  In 1997 alone, $14 million were paid for environmental services 
covering some 100,000 hectares.  The law includes in its definition of environmental 
service carbon sequestration and storage, and the protection of watersheds, biodiversity, 
and ecosystems (Castro and Barrantes, 1999).  Although some activists complain that the 
amounts given are too small, today there are more applicants for the benefit than 
recipients, and consequently an increase in the ESP funds would be able to prevent 
further deforestation (Villegas and Hernández, 2004).  The next section reflects on the 
current conservation policy context and whether it is conducive for the implementation of 
a regulation that would increase the ESP funds or not. 
5.2.4  Problem framing
To analyze the perceptions surrounding the problem of deforestation in Costa 
Rica, a series of concept maps or frames were created from semi-structured interviews in 
which different stakeholders expressed how they understand the issue, its components, 
the relationships among them, and the potential solutions (Bryson, 1995).  The 
interviewees were selected based on political or rational authority.  All the participants 
hold some position of authority within organizations that participate in policy 
deliberation.  People from both the capital city and a rural area were chosen, but not all 
regions of the country where incorporated, and the process did not consider demographic 
variables.  The Nosara watershed, in the North-West of Costa Rica was selected as the 
rural area, and it is considered as a valid case for the study of deforestation because the 
biggest proportion of cattle ranches in the country are located there, and that area suffered 
the most intense deforestation during the 1980s and the most significant recovery during 
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the past few years.  A major fraction of the forests in private hands are located in that 
region.  However, other locations in the country may have slightly different dynamics, 
and the agriculture, urbanization, forestry and tourism components may mix differently in 
each place.
Each group of interviewees, along with their associated motives and trust 
judgments, is portrayed in Table 5.1.  The major observation that can be drawn from the 
list is that trust is pervasive, except on the side of the NGOs, which distrust the central 
government’s competence and degree to which they act in the public’s interest.  They 
also distrust the private sector’s honesty.  But that mistrust is not reciprocal.  The central 
government has taken into account the views of activists in the past and they recognize 
them as legitimate players in the policy-making process, and that is acknowledged by 
NGOs themselves.  The private sector is also not overly concerned with activists, which 
are seen as part of the political landscape, but not as a threat.  The local government also 
has some reservations about some of the policies supported by the central government.
The context for a deforestation policy is one that first of all acknowledges the 
progress made in the country so far, in particular since the passing of the Forestry Law 
amendments of 1996.  Since deforestation on private lands is practically banned, the real 
question is whether something can be done to increase the current amount of forest, 
particularly in highly unfertile, sloped, erodible terrain.
Another contextual dimension is that of the role of the state.  The conservation 
policy of the 1970s and 1980s was based on a clearly interventionist drive by which the 
state would expropriate vast tracts of land that would then be converted into National 
Parks.  Many of those expropriations have not yet been paid in full to former land 
104
owners, and considering that more than 25% of the country is already under some type of 
preservation status, the current intent of the state is that of enabling and facilitating 
conservation by the private sector, instead of doing it themselves (Varela and Corella, 
2003).
Table 5.1:  Actors, their motives and their trust judgments
Policy actor Motto / motives Trust judgment
Central 
government
Save the country –
maximize benefits 
for all
No evidence of distrust toward other actors.  Sees 
itself as open and receptive.  Working on 
“continuous improvement”.
Local 
government
Save the county –
progress for all
No evidence of distrust to any other actor, but some 
reservations with respect to the central government.  
Sees itself as provider of the people.  Interested in 
citizen’s economic progress and county 
development.
National 
NGO
Save the forest –
nature is to be 
protected
Distrusts both industry and the government, but 
satisfied with participation opportunities and has 
been able to influence other stakeholders in the 
past.
Regional 
NGO
Save the people –
nature sustains 
people
Distrusts both industry and the government, but 
satisfied with participation opportunities and has 
been able to influence other stakeholders in the 
past.
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Table 5.1 (cont):  Actors, their motives and their trust judgments
Policy actor Motto / motives Trust judgment
National 
cattle 
growers 
organization
Save the ranchers –
ranching is good for 
the country
No evidence of distrust to any other actor.  Works 
to improve productivity and conducts production 
research.
Local 
private 
cattle 
producer
Save the ranchers –
ranchers have a right 
to their way of life
Slight distrust towards central government, but 
overall satisfied with the status quo.
Local 
private 
preserve
Save the forest –
protecting the 
environment is a 
good thing
No evidence of distrust to any other actor.  
Satisfied with the status quo.
Academia Save the country –
sustainable 
development is the 
key
No evidence of distrust to any other actor.
The contemporary environmental policy history of Costa Rica suggests that lack 
of inclusiveness has been responsible for mediocre and ineffective solutions in the past.  
The alliance between the central government and the scientific community has always 
been strong.  The role of the private sector has been irregular, and in terms of 
conservation their input has not been the determining factor in policy discussions, until 
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recently.  Also recent has been the role played by NGOs (Evans, 1999).  Any relevant 
move to perpetuate the conservation gains of the past few years and make deforestation 
policy robust in Costa Rica will have to be inclusive.  A suitable stakeholder participation 
strategy would avoid extremes such as pre-emption or exclusive third party mediation.  In 
the present case consultation seems to be the best approach, with the government taking 
the lead in the process, using academia as an objective technical resource, and making an 
effort to obtain and consider input from activists and the private sector.  
The concept maps of different stakeholder groups are explained in the following 
paragraphs.  Figures 5.1 through 5.4 were created by listing all the main terms or subjects 
mentioned by the interviewees and writing them on rectangles of three different sizes, 
according to how frequently they were mentioned during the conversation and how much 
importance was given to each of them by the stakeholder.  The rectangles were 
positioned such that related concepts are close to one another.  Arrows were used 
occasionally to show relationships emphasized by the participants.
Figure 5.1 suggests that the Costa Rican Federation for the Protection of Nature 
(FECON) considers the ESP a good policy instrument, and they emphasize the need to 
expand it through the revenues the water canon component of the Hydrologic Resource 
Law would generate.  They also see the need to force the tourism industry to contribute to 
the ESP fund, because they are major beneficiaries from the protection of nature in 
general.  More than 75% of the tourists in Costa Rica express that their major reason for 
choosing that destination is its natural beauty (Evans, 1999).
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Figure 5.1: The frame of a national NGO
The view of FECON with respect to the role of the political parties and the 
difference between the two major ones is that their role has been irregular and 
inconsistent, for example they support the ESP but also massive tourism, which can be 
detrimental for the environment.  The role of the government is accepted as that of a 
policy-maker with the legitimacy to establish regulations and enforce them, but there 
could be a potential conflict if prominent NGOs in Costa Rica continue feeling that the
actions of the government are contradictory and insufficient.  With respect to the role of 
forestry, FECON accepts it as a viable and legitimate economic activity, provided that no 
taxpayers’ money is spent subsidizing them.
Figure 5.2 conveys the message from the cattle sector: problems related to 
deforestation do not stem from grasslands per se, but from improperly managed ones, 
corresponding to the “traditional pastures” rectangle on the left of the diagram, shown in 
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stark contrast to the “improved pastures” block on the right.  Their view is that farms that 
utilize good seeds, rotation, and otherwise modern and sustainable techniques have only 
benefits for the community, but unfortunately still today many ranchers operate in a sea 
of ignorance where infertility, overgrazing, low yields and pollution are common.
Figure 5.2:  The frame of the cattle sector
Figure 5.3 is the result of a high degree of consistency in the opinions expressed 
by leaders from the major political parties and a congressman, who emphasize the strong 
degree of consensus in Congress around environmental matters.  The major parties see 
the ESP as something to be fortified with the water canon, but they also recognize the 
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role, value, and importance of different sectors in society, like the cattle sector and the 
forestry sector, that can prevent undesirable wood imports.
Figure 5.3:  The frame of Congress
The congressional apparatus sees itself as committed to the protection of the 
environment, proud of the progress made so far with successes such as the consolidation 
of the National Parks System, and excited about the prospects of the draft bill Law of the 
Hydrologic Resource and its water canon component, which has been distilled from a 
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lengthy participatory process through which several sectors in society were consulted.  
Public acceptance of congressional actions is important to them. The government is also 
thinking about ways to motivate or force the private sector in general so they make 
contributions to the ESP.  The national electricity distribution agency has been 
voluntarily donating funds to the ESP for a few years, because most of the electricity in 
Costa Rica comes from hydroelectric dams, fed by water stored in forests.
Figure 5.4 combines the views of a municipal government and rural offices of the 
agriculture and the environment ministries.
Figure 5.4:  The frame of the local government
L O C A L
G O V E R N M E N T
ReforestationWater
Shortages
NGOs
TourismPoverty
Ideal Land UseCattle
Solid Waste
Preserves
Coffee
Diversifica-
tion
Pesticides
Fertilizers
Zoning Profits
RegulationsTaxes
Intensifica-
tion
Central
Government
Potable Water
Education
Forest
Recovery
Aquifer
Protection
Floods
111
For them, the current land use is very close to being ideal.  The current situation is 
the result of the interests of the private land owners and the implementation of effective 
regulations (including zoning and taxes). They see as positive and relevant the diverse 
existing land-uses and their associated benefits.  The advantages of a balanced land-use 
pattern are listed on the right of the map.  One case of policy consensus and one of policy 
conflict and can be drawn from this figure.  The first one is the beneficial and prominent 
role that the local government gives NGOs, which are regarded as allies in the protection 
of the environment and the quest for sustainable development.  The second one is the 
dissenting view with respect to some of the policies promoted by the central government, 
like massive tourism.  There is a visible gap between the central and the local 
governments, and legitimate policy will require at least a partial closure of that gap.
Other observations from the figure include the view that taxes have to be regarded 
carefully, because the standard of living of citizens in remote locations is often low, and 
additional dues could draw people further into poverty.  And finally, problems other than 
deforestation are regarded as more important by the locals, and those appear on the left of 
the map.
The aggregate map is shown in Figure 5.5.  Society appears in the middle, as the 
entity that is composed of the actors previously described and others, and as the unit that 
debates between allocating land to conservation (right side) or other uses (left side).  
Conservation is in general seen as a good thing, while most actors tend to discuss other 
land uses in a negative way, or in a way that accepts them as valid but not preferable to 
conservation.  The case of domestic demand for wood potentially becoming larger than 
supply stands out from the “forestry” rectangle, because it is a preoccupation of several 
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people.  A crisis in the forestry sector could lead to the unwanted situation of importing 
wood. 
Figure 5.5:  Aggregate map
Environmental service payments are seen as a good thing that should be 
augmented with the water canon, something to be discussed in Congress and currently 
supported at large by those who know about it.  Tourism is both a beneficiary of 
conservation and a potential promoter or detractor of it, depending on whether it is done 
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in an environmentally sound way or not.  Finally, NGOs appear represented in a 
prominent way as watchers and influencers of everything related to the dilemma of land 
use decisions and policies.
The main areas of disagreement apparently are between local and central 
governments and between NGOs and the central government.  Since Congress is the one 
taking the lead in proposing legislation to strengthen conservation, it is imperative that 
the views of municipalities, ministry branches and NGOs be taken into consideration.  
The major potential consensus will take place among ranchers, local government offices, 
and NGOs. 
5.2.5 Policy alternatives
The two policy alternatives were chosen from a review of the conservation history 
of Costa Rica and from the opinions of experts consulted.  The first one consists in 
increasing the funds for conservation subsidies, like the water canon intends to do 
through the Hydrologic Resource Law by imposing a tax on the consumption of potable 
water.  An alternative aligned with the drive by the government to avoid pure command 
and control is to increase the cattle production tax on marginal lands.  Other types of 
more recent and complex regulatory instruments, such as tradable permits, are excluded 
from the analysis due to the lack of experience with them in Costa Rica1.
1
 Inaction is also a viable alternative, but it is highly questionable that it would accomplish the goal of 
increasing the forested area in private hands.  If the ESP continues with its funds limited to revenues from 
the fossil fuel tax and occasional donations, then very few new contracts would be signed for additional 
conservation.  The panorama for the next few years would consequently be one similar to the status quo, 
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Table 5.2 shows the ranking of the two alternatives according to legitimacy 
criteria and associated goals (Clemons and McBeth, 2001).
Table 5.2:  Policy alternatives ranked against legitimacy criteria
Superior policy# Legitimacy criteria Objective
Increase 
subsidies
Tax 
ranching
1 Technical implementability Turn infertile, sloped, 
erodible land into forest


2 Technical implementability Increase forested land 
in private hands


3 Economic efficiency and 
administrative 
implementability
Minimize expenses for 
the government
- -
4 Political feasibility Utilize tested policy 
instruments


5 Stakeholder acceptability Maximize acceptance 
of the policy


5.2.5.1 Technical implementability
The ability of the policy to achieve its major intended goal is explored here.  The 
first objective is the most important one, since it would turn areas of low productivity and 
prone to high pollution loads into forests.  The second objective is also relevant and it 
stems from the general desire by the government and other stakeholders to continue 
recovering the forest that was lost to pastures during the second half of the 20th century.  
with the majority of the ESP used to pay existing contracts.  For that reason this alternative was not 
included in the analysis.
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There are obvious constraints to forest expansion, such as the societal need to satisfy to 
the extent possible the food and housing requirements of the citizenry, and the fact that 
forest in some locations can not grow due to climatic and soil conditions.  Values, 
customs, and perceptions also play a role in the decision-making process of the land 
owner.  Even after the implementation of policies aimed at influencing the private sector 
towards conservation, some individuals will continue keeping their farms.
The ESP however would make conservation more attractive for ranchers 
operating at low profitability levels, and therefore it is considered a technically feasible 
solution to increase forested land.  The tax on marginal lands could also work by 
discouraging the production of cattle in those locations, with the added benefit of revenue 
generation for local governments.
However, an increase in the property tax is not as likely to influence a farmer as 
much as an incentive.  The tax increase can prompt the farmer to negotiate with the 
authority the valuation of the property (the tax is based on property values), to look for 
ideas to maintain profitability, and to complain.  The ESP offers something in exchange 
for abandoning the grassland and letting it recover into forest: a constant stream of 
revenue.  It is also important to consider that although grassland is the major competitor 
of forest in Costa Rica, it is not the only one.  The tax on cattle production attacks the 
biggest problem, but not the only problem, while the subsidy for conservation has a wider 
scope, promoting conservation in many places, not only around pastures.  The water 
canon is therefore considered a superior policy from the technical implementability 
perspective.
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5.2.5.2 Economic efficiency and administrative implementability
Decisions are made in a context of scarcity, and so the policy maker should be 
concerned about obtaining the biggest return for the minimum expense.  Also, a policy 
that is perceived as “efficient” may gain higher acceptability than one that is not.
The increase in government expenses with the implementation of the Hydrologic 
Resource Law would be minimal, since the ESP and its administrative agency already 
exist.  The program would simply have to establish a procedure whereby the money 
collected through the water canon is channeled from the water suppliers to them.  The 
law calls for the creation of a new agency that would assume all the duties related to 
water use, but its staff would be composed of individuals currently working for other 
agencies that up to now have had partial responsibilities with respect to water issues.  
Also, since the law creates a new tax on the consumption of potable water it is expected 
that administrative expenses would be paid by the new revenues.
A similar reasoning applies to the tax on marginal lands: municipalities collect 
and administer property taxes in Costa Rica, and the program proposed here is simply a 
modification of such existing mechanism.  The increase in government expenditures is 
therefore expected to be minimal in both cases, and as a consequence, both alternatives 
are considered equal from the perspective of economic efficiency and administrative 
implementability.
5.2.5.3 Political feasibility
For the past several years, Congress has lost interest in purchasing land to convert 
it into State-owned protected areas.  Improvements in conservation are wanted, but 
through non-interventionist policies.  Also, cattle production is perceived by most 
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stakeholders as a viable and needed economic activity in the country and therefore the 
use of pure command and control to force ranchers to abandon their lifestyle would not 
be supported by many.
Neither alternative is putting strict, specific limits on the grassland coverage in the 
country, but a tax that is automatically converted into a subsidy for conservation that can 
positively affect the entire country is a far more reaching and benign policy instrument 
than simply a tax that will affect a few and can be perceived by the far right as unjust and 
an attack on free enterprise.  The increase in the subsidy budget is therefore considered 
superior in that respect to the tax on marginal lands.
5.2.5.4 Stakeholder acceptability
Since the Hydrologic Resource Law would impose a tax on drinking water, 
people living under the poverty line would be the most affected, but there could be an 
exemption for the first several liters consumed per month, so as not to affect the most 
disadvantaged.  The regulation has been widely discussed and it is a good example of 
participatory policy-making.  Also, according to Steinberg (2001), a survey conducted 
during the mid-1990s concluded that 91% of Costa Ricans were willing to pay more for 
electricity and water if the additional money was to be used for biodiversity conservation.  
Therefore, it can be envisaged that people’s satisfaction with this alternative will be high.
The tax on marginal lands would be harder on small, low revenue farms.  Those 
who decide to abandon cattle production would have to be helped in finding another way 
of making a living, and the design of such a compensation mechanism would minimize 
resistance against the policy.  That is not unreasonable and it has been done in the past.  
Esposito (2002) for example, discusses at length the case of integrative conservation in an 
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area of the North-West of Costa Rica in which former farmers became park rangers or 
tourism entrepreneurs when their lands were expropriated to expand a conservation area.  
Another issue related to the tax may be a potential increase in the price of domestic beef.  
If the area dedicated to pastures decreases, supply may become limited forcing the price 
up.  Nevertheless, the drive by the government to promote agricultural intensification on 
fertile lands may counter-balance that scenario.  The tax would affect only a relatively 
small number of people, while the benefits would accrue to society at large, and therefore 
this alternative is considered superior to the water canon in terms of stakeholder 
acceptability.
5.2.5.5 Summary
Taxing cattle production in marginal lands is superior to increasing conservation 
subsidies only with respect to one objective, while increasing the subsidies for 
conservation is superior with respect to three objectives, and there is one tie in the 
analysis2.
Although increasing taxes on marginal lands is a viable alternative that might 
enjoy wider acceptance by most stakeholders, the Hydrologic Resource Law is a superior 
policy because it is expected to be more effective in reaching the goal of converting all 
2
 As an additional comparison tool, an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) was simulated with Expert Choice 
(2005).  The software requires pair-wise comparisons between criteria and the ranking of each alternative 
against each criterion, either using a numerical system or value judgments.  The final synthesis obtained 
corresponded to a score of 0.592 for the alternative of increasing conservation subsidies, while taxing cattle 
production had a score of 0.408, and the model inconsistency was 0.08.  This result supports and 
complements what was obtained in Table 2, in that the subsidy option is superior to the tax option by a 
relevant, although not dramatic, margin.
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remaining pastures in fragile lands to forest and increasing the total forested area in 
private hands.  Both alternatives are less interventionist than pure command and control, 
none of them is expected to increase real government expenditures, and both are policy 
instruments that have been tested in the past with relative success.
The draft bill is seen in a positive way by the two major political parties, the main 
NGOs, and academia, and therefore it is expected that it will convey political benefits to 
the policymakers, considering that a strong opposition is not likely from any important 
constituency.  The bill was a prominent part of two of the four individual concept maps 
and the aggregate map presented in Section 5.2.4, and the policy would not conflict with 
existing regulations or administrative agencies.
5.2.6  Conclusion
This study has shown that the views from the major stakeholders about the 
problem of deforestation in Costa Rica are conducive to the successful implementation of 
the Hydrologic Resource Law as a policy to strengthen conservation in the country.  Its 
water canon component is a superior regulatory instrument when compared to the 
alternative of increasing taxes on marginal lands.  
The problem of deforestation in Costa Rica is primarily about observable facts.  
Values play a role, but one that supports facts in that Costa Ricans are in general 
supporters of conservation.  Trust in experts is therefore high.  Moreover, about 80% of 
Costa Ricans understand the value of conserving forests for water storage (Castro and 
Barrantes, 1999), indicating that social trust is also high.  Trust in the government, on the 
other hand, tends to be low.  Although people tend to remember some of the highlights of 
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past administrations, in general the government is perceived as favoring the interests of a 
few and lacking implementation skill.  Policy-making under this context needs to be 
articulated by experts with little stakeholder involvement, and then the government 
adopts the regulation (Focht, 1995).  The process that culminated with the draft bill for 
the Hydrologic Resource Law was more inclusive, and perhaps that explains why three 
years of revisions were needed, but that enriched the outcome and it should prevent post-
adoption critiques.  The key to maximize stakeholder satisfaction is to educate the 
citizenry about the program and to publicize its benefits once they are measurable.  
People will need to perceive that the extra amount they pay for potable water is truly 
serving a purpose that benefits the country in a significant way.
Other considerations regarding the specific program design are worth mentioning.  
For example, an initial investment will be needed in education, coordinating the tax 
collection work of water suppliers, defining how the new monetary resources will flow 
into the agency managing the ESP, and planning how the new budget will be utilized for 
new and longer conservation contracts.  Before the new tribute starts generating funds 
there will be some expenses that will need to be accounted for.  The policy should also 
include a revision period that would force the executive branch to evaluate results and 
propose improvements.  Such clauses have been rare so far in the Costa Rican legal codes 
(Sagot, 2000).  And finally, a process for obtaining feedback from stakeholders should 
ideally be included in the ruling.
The current political landscape in Costa Rica makes the timing for a congressional 
discussion and approval of the Hydrologic Resource Law very uncertain.  From the first 
time since the foundation of the Second Republic in 1949, the 2002 general elections saw 
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the emergence of a third prominent party, whose views on environmental matters are to 
this day unclear.  Although they are still far from being able to mobilize the majority of 
the electorate, their existence can no longer be ignored and congressional negotiations 
will have to include them.  With general elections taking place again in 2006, the timing 
for a discussion of the law in Congress it is not predictable, considering that matters such 
as tax reform and the ratification of free trade agreements are using up most of the 
legislative time, and taking into account that continuity is a challenge in a country where 
serving in Congress two consecutive terms is prohibited.
Will the Hydrologic Resource Law ever be implemented?  The consensus about 
its benefits and the support from major stakeholders are not enough.  Although Costa 
Ricans support environmental legislation, they are more concerned about poverty 
alleviation, corruption prevention and crime reduction.  The leadership of concerned 
policy-makers and activists will be tested in the upcoming months.  If they succeed, a 
historical milestone in the conservation history of Costa Rica will be reached.
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5.2.8  Appendix
Table 5.3: List of experts interviewed
Name Title Affiliation Organization 
type
Germán Rojas President, Environmental 
Matters Commission
Congress Central 
Government
Edwin Estrada Advisor in Environmental 
Matters
PUSC political party Political party
Marco A. 
Corrales
Advisor in Environmental 
Matters
PLN political party Political party
Wadi Mejías Officer Hojancha 
Municipality
Local 
government
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Table 5.3 (cont.): List of experts interviewed
Name Title Affiliation Organization 
type
Danilo Méndez Sub-regional chief Environment 
Ministry Hojancha
Regional 
government
Gilberto López Officer Agricultural Ministry 
Hojancha
Regional 
government
Miguel 
Méndez
Manager Monte Alto Preserve Private sector 
conservation
Wilmarth 
Matarrita
President Fedeagua Local NGO
Juan Figuerola Coordinator of forest issues FECON National NGO
Dr. Edgar Ortiz Representative FONAFIFO Scholar
Alvaro Monge Agriculture coordinator Intl. Commerce 
Ministry
Central 
Government
Miguel Vallejo Manager of consulting 
services
Fundacion 
Neotropica
National NGO
Carlos Sandí Professor EARTH University Scholar
Gerardo 
Vargas
Representative Corfoga Private sector
Ronald 
Guerrero
General Manager Precious Woods Private sector
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5.3   Concluding remarks
It is not surprising that the water canon component in the Law of the Hydrologic 
Resource ended up being the preferred alternative by most stakeholders.  After all, some 
of them have worked on the draft bill themselves, or they have been invited to provide 
input.  Although imposing a tax on cattle production on marginal lands is a viable 
alternative, it is not seen by politicians or NGOs as something worth discussing in detail, 
because the other alternative is more far reaching and it has a number of key provisions 
beyond just taxing potable water to increase funds for conservation.
The Law of the Hydrologic Resource was sanctioned in April of 2005 by the 
Environmental Matters Commission in Congress.  It declares that access to water is a 
human right, that the lack of absolute scientific certainty should not be used to postpone 
the implementation of solutions aimed at preventing environmental damages 
(precautionary principle), and that the unit of management of water in the country is the 
watershed.
The law would not only centralize in a new agency all the competencies related to 
water that today are distributed among several government offices, but it also creates a 
National Water Council that would be composed of representatives from the government, 
NGOs, academia, and industry for the deliberation, discussion, and coordination between 
the government and other sectors in society regarding matters related to water.  The 
regulation also has a number of novel features that have not been used in previous 
legislative texts (Sagot 2000).  For example, it imposes a tax on the use of water for the 
purpose of waste disposal, forcing the private sector to pay for fresh water, comply with 
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discharge limits, and also pay for those discharges.  The discharge tax is to be adjusted
annually according to inflation, and the discharge permits would not be allowed to exceed 
six years.  The draft bill also specifies how the funds collected through the new tributes 
are to be used, and the list includes not only augmenting the budget for the ESP, but also 
expanding environmental education, research, monitoring, etc.  For the first time since 
the ESP was created, this new law entitles indigenous groups to receive conservation 
subsidies for the preserves they occupy (Asamblea Legislativa 2005). 
 In sum, the law seems to be very well written and in accordance with the 
priorities and input received from many stakeholders during more than three years.  The 
date when it will be discussed by Congress is unknown, but when that day comes, 
chances are it will be approved relatively easily.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This project has followed a method by which any developing country could 
approach conservation policy formulation, particularly those looking to increase their 
exports in agricultural commodities and at the same time trying to protect natural habitat.
The only practical condition for the method to be applicable is that the information be 
obtainable, particularly for the hydrologic model.  Naturally, other nations may have 
different dynamics where deforestation is caused by other reasons or the policy 
instruments to be analyzed are different, based on government structures, historical 
tendencies, etc.  And then, places with high political instability or with a very low gross 
national product per capita will most likely be focused on solving those issues before they 
can turn their attention to matters of trade and biodiversity protection.
The Environmental Service Payment (ESP) in Costa Rica is a practical policy 
instrument, and this dissertation has shown that combined with other initiatives it can 
promote significant reductions in water pollution while increasing net social welfare and 
maintaining high stakeholder acceptability.  Since forest owners are legally prevented 
from deforesting their land, it is reasonable that they try to increase their rent by applying 
for the ESP.  The big unknown is whether the subsidy will promote, in the future, the 
reforestation of existing pastures.  This study demonstrated that if the government helps 
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the private sector profit from other sources of income like ecotourism, conservation will 
be possible.  The potential decrease in the production of beef due to some ranchers going 
out of the business can be off-set by agricultural intensification in other farms, with a 
potential decrease in river pollution.
However, for such a comprehensive strategy to work, different agencies in the 
government and other entities will have to work together and coordinate their efforts in a 
more systematic way.  For example, the conversion from pasture to forest is long (over 
10 years) and may be costly.  A new type of ESP was recently created to compensate 
ranchers for every standing tree of a certain diameter in their property (Fondo Nacional 
de Financiamiento Forestal 2005).  Those types of initiatives can make the transition 
easier from the financial point of view.  To take the risk of reforesting, the landowner 
needs to be supported through credit to cover capital expenditures, particularly 
considering that larger investments may result in larger profits when managing a forest 
preserve as a tourist attraction.  The Costa Rican Tourism Board could play a prominent 
role in facilitating those credits.  Also, the energy and authority enjoyed today by NGOs 
in Costa Rica could be more useful if they spent resources analyzing and dealing with the 
cattle sector, major competitor of forests in the country, instead of watching only the 
shrinking forestry sector.  And finally, agencies in general need to learn how to evaluate 
the programs they manage, and how to publicize their success.  For example, after eight 
years no study has been conducted to estimate the benefits the ESP has provided the 
country.
Other types of studies also need to be undertaken.  The whole theme of 
agricultural intensification, the gains in pollution and the economic implications should 
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be researched in more detail, including the consequence of utilizing fertilizers.  The effect 
of pollution on fisheries and tourism also requires further examination.  From an 
international perspective, a trade analysis could also provide key insights into the 
relationship between liberalization, environment and domestic policy.  A basic two 
country, two commodity scenario could be the starting point, with Costa Rica and the US 
trading fine and cheap beef cuts.  Another dimension that could play a role and therefore 
deserves attention is the power of foreign consumers and the possibility that they would 
demand or prefer certifications for beef (labeling requirements) with respect to 
environmental performance. 
Meaningful and long term conservation is possible in the developing world.  
Countries such as Costa Rica can modernize and exploit their natural resources in a 
sustainable way.  This work has shown one possible path to promote that type of 
development through domestic environmental policy.
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APPENDIX I
SOILS RE-CLASSIFICATION
Table A.1.1.  Re-classification of Costa Rican soils within the Nosara watershed into the 
United States Geological Survey soil series.
# Costa Rican soil 
code
USGS soil 
series
Series geographic origin Percent watershed 
area
1 A010 Atate Guam 78.29
2 I156 Chacha Guam 10.47
3 A011 Amelia Puerto Rico 4.33
4 I153 Pakala Hawaii 3.11
5 E005 Guayama Puerto Rico 2.51
6 A014 Callabo Puerto Rico 0.76
7 I157 Dorothea Virgin Islands 0.39
8 I154 Humacao Puerto Rico 0.14
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APPENDIX II
USE OF A TAX ON POLLUTION
Table A.2.1 shows the effect a tax on pollution would have on the percent area 
under pasture that would maximize profits for the private sector in Nosara.
Table A.2.1.  Effect of the pollution tax on the relationship between net profit and area 
under pasture.
Tax on pollution 
$/yr/(mg/l)
Optimum percent cover 
under pasture (%)
Net Profit W ($)
900 75 31,086,991
700 75 31,995,845
500 84 32,947,077
300 93 34,097,085
100 97 35,363,482
Note: in all cases =0.85, O=$34.68, B=25% and =1%
The table shows that increases in the pollution tax decrease W, because that 
means the farmer is paying the government higher amounts and therefore less remains as 
profit for the private sector.  An annual tax of $100 for each mg/l would barely change 
the optimum percent area under pasture as compared to the baseline scenario of 98%, but
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a tax of $700/yr/(mg/l) would shift the optimum to 75% pasture.  Higher taxes would not 
increase forested area beyond that percentage.
The value of W for 25% of the watershed under forest in Figure A.2.1 is similar to 
that obtained in Figure 4.4 with the tax on grassland (about $32 million).  However, in 
practice there could be differences in what specific HRUs or farms get converted first to 
forest.
It is important to consider implementability issues with respect to a possible tax 
on pollution.  To be successful, such a program would have to allow for some sort of 
periodic measurement, inspection, and modeling so that the pollution generated from 
each farm can be estimated and the tax can be charged accordingly.  Considering that 
Costa Rica is still far from having such a system in place, a tax on pollution is not seen as 
viable for the time being.
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APPENDIX III
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
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APPENDIX IV
SAMPLE QUESTIONS UTILIZED DURING THE INTERVIEWS
1. After loosing almost all of its forested land in private hands, Costa Rica made a 
come-back in the last decade.  Is deforestation still a problem in the country?
2. What are the potential solutions to control deforestation in Costa Rica and 
promote the protection of natural habitat?
3. Has the environmental service payment been an effective tool so far?
4. Could the current oil price crisis jeopardize the ESP?
5. What are the chances of the water canon being approved by Congress promptly?
6. How would you describe the relationship between the two major parties with 
respect to the discussion of environmental matters?
7. How do you compare the water canon to the option of a tax on pastureland?
8. Why do you believe the water canon is a better alternative?
9. What objectives would the water canon satisfy?
10. What are other significant environmental problems in Costa Rica nowadays?
11. How do you describe the role of your organization in the issue of deforestation?
12. What other entities play a role in the conservation policy arena and how would 
you describe the relationships between your organization and those other entities?
13. Why are only 1/3 of farmers practicing agricultural intensification?
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